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Dividend Taxation in Europe: When the ECJ Makes Tax Policy
by
Michael J. Graetz and Alvin C. Warren, Jr.*

1.

Introduction

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has decided more than a
hundred cases involving Member States’ income tax systems. The vast
majority of these decisions hold that national tax legislation violates either
the guarantee against discrimination on the basis of nationality or the
guarantee of free movement for goods, persons, services and capital found
in the EC Treaty.1 In an earlier article, we analyzed the Court’s corporate
income tax jurisprudence and assessed its potential impact on the economic
and political integration of Europe.2 We concluded that the ECJ is
undermining the fiscal autonomy of the Member States by articulating a view
of income tax discrimination that is ultimately unstable. That article also
argued that the Court’s general approach to income tax issues is incoherent
because it seeks to eliminate discrimination based on both the origin and
destination of economic activity –‐ an impossible quest in the absence of
harmonized income tax bases and rates, a situation that does not now exist
in the EU and may never exist.3
In this article, we examine the ECJ’s recent decisions regarding cross‐
border dividends from the perspective of tax policy. To some Court
watchers, this may seem an odd perspective. The ECJ has no explicit charge
to make income tax policy, which is generally left to the Member States by
*

Michael J. Graetz is Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Alvin C.
Warren, Jr. is Ropes & Gray Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. We are grateful for
comments on a previous draft at a Harvard seminar by Malcolm Gammie, Daniel Halperin,
Walter Hallerstein, Michael Lang, Richard Lyal, Ruth Mason, Stephen Shay, Otmar
Thoemmes, Frans Vanistendael and Richard Vann. The views expressed in this article are,
however, those of the authors alone.
1

Single European Act art. 13, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. The Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Nov. 10, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, incorporated the guarantees of the Single
European Act: freedom of movement for workers, id. art. 49, and freedom of establishment,
id. arts. 43, 48, freedom to provide services, id. art. 49, and freedom of movement of capital,
id. arts. 56, 58.
2

Michael J. Graetz and Alvin C. Warren Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political
and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 Yale Law Journal 1186 (2006).
3
Id. at 1216‐19.
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the European treaties. Indeed, EU income tax legislation continues to require
the unanimous consent of all Member States. All the ECJ can do is decide
cases brought to it by the European Commission or a national court on the
ground that one or more of the freedoms guaranteed by the European
treaties has been violated.4 And, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the ECJ has
no control over its agenda, as it cannot choose which cases to hear.
Nonetheless, the Court has become deeply enmeshed in fashioning
the Member States’ income tax policies. As we shall detail, the Court is
applying a standard of nondiscrimination to evaluate national tax laws in a
manner totally divorced from the underlying tax policy norms that produced
the legislation at issue. The result is a jurisprudence that fails to hold
together substantively, functionally, and rhetorically. In many instances, this
result follows from largely formalistic distinctions made by the Court, such
as whether a withholding tax on dividends should be considered corporate
or shareholder taxation. To be sure, the Court’s task is exceptionally difficult.
The issues before it have often been found to be intractable by legislators, so
that one can hardly fault a judicial body, with its much more limited
mandate, for producing results whose tax policy norms are difficult, if not
impossible, to fathom.
To illustrate the overwhelming difficulties that the ECJ confronts in
fashioning European income tax policy, we examine in detail the dozen
decisions of the Court that set forth its vision of a nondiscriminatory system
for taxing corporate income distributed as dividends within the European
Union. This is an important and rapidly developing area, with half of the
decisions handed down since 2006. Cross‐border dividends provide a
striking example of the difficulties now facing the Court. For a number of
reasons, corporate‐source income originating in one country may bear a
lower total tax burden when distributed as a dividend to shareholders in the
same country than when distributed as a dividend to shareholders in another
country. The ECJ has reacted to this possibility by invalidating tax provisions
in either the country in which a dividend is paid or the country in which it is
received. The tax policy dilemma facing the Court is that unless it wants to
invalidate taxes in both countries, it must choose between eliminating
discrimination on the basis of the destination or origin of corporate
investment, but it has no legal basis for making such a choice.
4

Although not generally relevant to income taxation, the Court can also adjudicate cases
between Member States.
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Before turning to the details of the decisions that have placed the ECJ
in this dilemma, we need to identify the principal tax policy issues that arise
in constructing a system for taxing cross‐border dividends and review the
standard solutions found in domestic legislation and international tax
treaties.
2. Issues in the Design of Cross‐Border Dividend Taxation
We begin by considering seven potentially complicating factors that
must be addressed in constructing a system for taxing corporate income and
dividends that cross national borders: (1) separate taxation of corporations
and shareholders within a single country; (2) taxation of income to more than
one corporation within a single country; (3) multiple taxation of transnational
income by different countries; (4) different forms of transnational corporate
investment; (5) differing conceptions of neutrality and nondiscrimination in
determining how to tax transnational income; (6) different resolutions of
these issues by a single nation with respect to investments in and from
different foreign countries; and (7) the division among countries of the tax
revenue produced by taxing corporate‐source income.
The taxation of corporations and their shareholders has long been a
vexing problem throughout the world. Income taxes generally apply to both
corporations and to individual shareholders. This creates the potential for
economic double taxation even when the corporation and its shareholders are
located within a single country: income may be taxed first to the corporation
as it is earned and then again when distributed to individual shareholders as
a dividend. Different countries have varied in their responses to this
possibility, and countries’ policies have also varied over time. At one
extreme, so‐called classical tax systems simply permit the resulting double
taxation. At the opposite extreme, some countries have integrated their
corporate and individual income taxes by providing a full or partial tax credit
to shareholders for corporate taxes previously paid with respect to income
distributed as a dividend. If all of the corporate tax may be credited by
shareholders, this imputation of corporate taxes to shareholders would
convert the corporate tax into a withholding levy on income ultimately taxed
to investors.5 In order to avoid the possibility of shareholder credits for
5

Consider a corporation that earns 100, pays 30 in corporate taxes and distributes half of
the remaining 70 to each of its two 50‐percent shareholders, whose individual tax rates are
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dividends on which corporate income tax was not previously collected, some
imputation systems have required corporations to pay a compensatory tax to
make up any shortfall on the payment of a dividend.6 These compensatory
taxes follow from the function of corporate taxation under imputation as
withholding of taxes ultimately paid by individual shareholders.
As an alternative to using imputation to mitigate or eliminate the
burden of economic double taxation, some countries have reduced corporate
taxes when income is distributed. More recently, many countries have
reduced shareholder taxes by applying a lower rate or partial exclusion for
dividends.7 In terms of domestic tax policy, a country’s choice among these
options will depend, in part, on its views regarding the economic effects of
taxing corporate‐source income more heavily than other capital income,
compliance burdens of the various alternatives (and who should bear them),
and the relationship between corporate and individual tax rates.8 A key
40 and 20 percent. Each shareholder is taxed on the gross amount of 50 (cash dividend plus
tax credit), subject to a tax credit of 15. As shown in the following table, the corporate levy
functions as a withholding tax, in that the corporate income distributed to each shareholder
ultimately bears a tax burden determined by that individual’s tax rate.
Shareholder 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
6

Tax rate
Cash distribution
Tax credit
Taxable amount (2+3)
Gross tax (1x4)
Final Tax (refund) (5‐3)
After‐tax cash (2‐6)
Total taxes (3+6)
Effective tax rate (8/4)

40%
35
15
50
20
5
30
20
40%

Shareholder 2
20%
35
15
50
10
(5)
40
10
20%

If the corporation in the example in the preceding note had paid only 20 in taxes, it would
owe 10 more on distribution of the dividend, because the shareholder‐credit mechanism
assumes that 30 of corporate taxes have been paid for every 70 of cash distributed as a
dividend, given a corporate tax rate of 30 percent.
7
See generally, Richard J. Vann, Trends in company/shareholder taxation: single or double
taxation?, 88a Cahiers de droit fiscal international 21 (2003).
8
For further discussion of the issues involved in designing an integrated tax system, see
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems:
Taxing Business Income Once (1992); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Am. Law Inst., Integration of the
Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, Reporter’s Study of Corporate Tax Integration
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consideration in any form of integration of corporate and shareholder taxes
is reduction of differentials in the taxation of equity and debt capital. The
latter is generally exempt from economic double taxation, because interest
payments are deductible from corporate income.
When one corporation owns shares in another corporation, a common
occurrence, the potential exists for triple or even greater taxation of the same
economic incomes. For example, when a corporation holding stock in
another corporation receives dividends or sells shares, there is the possibility
of taxation to both corporations of the same item of economic income. This
we call multiple corporate taxation. Many countries have enacted provisions
aimed at reducing this possibility, including exclusions for intercorporate
dividends or gains on the sale of shares, as well as elections allowing
consolidation of the income of the corporations and taxing them as a group.9
When corporate income crosses national borders, there is the
additional, and distinct, potential for international double taxation (which is
sometimes called juridical double taxation). This possibility arises because
both the country in which the income is produced (the source country) and
the country to which it is distributed (the residence country of the distributee)
have traditionally asserted jurisdiction to tax. Countries generally reduce or
eliminate international double taxation by exempting foreign source income
or allowing credits for foreign taxes paid, either as a matter of domestic law
or in the bilateral income tax treaties that we describe below.
The potential for multiple corporate taxation, as well as for economic
and international double taxation, is further complicated by the different
forms of international investments in and by corporations. For example, an
individual A, who is a resident of country R, might own stock in company X
(also resident in country R), which operates in country S through a wholly‐
owned subsidiary, company Y, which is a resident in country S. In this case,
there are potentially four levels of taxation. Country S typically taxes the
income of company Y under its income tax. In addition, it may levy a
(1993); and Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual
Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 Tax Notes 1767 (1999). The foregoing are collected in
Integration of the U.S. Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: The Treasury Department
and American Law Institute Reports (Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr. eds., 1998)
[hereinafter Treasury and ALI Integration Reports].
9

See, e.g.,U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [hereinafter IRC] §243 (intercorporate
dividend deduction), §338(h)(10) (nontaxation on the sale of certain shares by parent
companies), and §1501 (taxation of affiliated corporations).
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withholding tax on the dividend distributions to foreign shareholders,
company X in our example. (In spite of being called a withholding tax, this
is a final tax, which is generally levied because the nonresident shareholder
is not otherwise subject to income taxation in country S.) Subsequently,
country R might tax both company X on its income (including dividends it
receives from abroad) and shareholder A on his dividend receipts (including
dividends paid from income that originated abroad).
Individual A might also own some shares in companies operating
abroad. (This is usually called portfolio investment to distinguish it from direct
investment, which occurs when a company sets up a foreign branch or
subsidiary.) In this case, country S could again tax income that resulted in a
dividend to A twice (once when earned by the corporation and again when
distributed to A), depending on its views about economic and international
double taxation. Country R would also have the opportunity to tax this
income once, when received as a dividend by A.
Other forms of investment are also possible: A might own shares in
an investment fund, which then purchases shares in company Y.
Alternatively, company X might own only a limited number of shares in
company Y (which we call corporate portfolio investment). As a result, the
factual circumstances and governing legal rules that come before the ECJ are
extraordinarily complex and variable. To make our analysis manageable, we
will focus primarily on two of the cases illustrated above: direct investments
by corporations through majority‐owned subsidiaries and portfolio
investments by individuals who own less than a controlling interest in a
foreign company.
Constructing a neutral (or nondiscriminatory) system for taxing
dividends from cross‐border investment is thus complicated by the potential
for economic and international double taxation, multiple corporate taxation,
and longstanding differences in the tax treatment of direct and portfolio
investment by individuals and corporations. Those difficulties are further
compounded by the lack of agreement regarding the concept of neutrality
that should guide the design of such a system.
The two principal competing views of tax neutrality can be framed in
terms of source and residence countries (S and R in our example). Under the
first concept ‐ capital import neutrality ‐ all economic activity within a single
country (S) should bear the same tax burden, whether the capital used in
income production is domestic or foreign. Under the second concept ‐capital
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export neutrality ‐ all income earned by the residents of a single country
should bear the same tax burden, whether the income is earned at home or
abroad.10
The usual rationale for capital export neutrality is that worldwide
economic welfare will be maximized if locational choices (such as whether X
invests in country R or S) are not affected by taxation. From this perspective,
residence, but not source, countries should tax income. The usual rationale
for capital import neutrality is that it increases economic welfare by
encouraging the most efficient use of resources within a country. From this
perspective, source, but not residence, countries should tax income.
Economists have tended to favor capital export neutrality, while corporate
managers have tended to favor capital import neutrality.
It is now recognized that the two forms of neutrality cannot be
achieved simultaneously unless tax rates and bases are identical in source
and residence countries.11 The tax systems of many countries reflect both
principles. For example, the United States taxes U.S. companies on a world‐
wide basis, subject to a foreign tax credit, which generally promotes capital
export neutrality. On the other hand, the income of foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations is not generally taxed until it is repatriated to the U.S.,
which promotes capital import neutrality in the interim.
The tax law of many industrialized countries is therefore often
described as a compromise between capital import and capital export
neutrality. However, the nature of that compromise as reflected in the
10

A third concept, sometimes called “national neutrality,” argues for a deduction for
foreign taxes, rather than a credit or exemption, to alleviate international double taxation. The
key idea here is that domestic and foreign taxes are different because a country benefits only
from the taxes it collects. For further discussion of these concepts, see U.S. Congress, Joint
Committee on Taxation, Factors Affecting the International Competitiveness of the United
States 236‐248 (JCS‐6‐91,1991). See also Mihir A. Desai and James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating
International Tax Reform, 56 National Tax Journal 487 (2003) (arguing for ʺcapital ownership
neutralityʺ and ʺnational ownership neutralityʺ as new benchmarks for evaluating the
desirability of international tax reforms ; but see Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality,
Ownership Distortions, and International Tax Welfare Benchmarks, 26 Virginia Tax Review
53 (2006) (arguing that those benchmarks do not necessarily promote global and national
welfare).
11
For more on capital export and import neutrality, as well as a critical evaluation of the
role these concepts play in the analysis of international taxation, see Michael J. Graetz, Taxing
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies,
54 Tax Law Review 261 (2001).
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detailed rules of taxation, not only varies among countries, but also within
a single country over time. In addition, such national legislation is regularly
modified by bilateral tax treaties, in which the two signatory nations agree
to a particular tax regime, including the treatment of cross‐border dividends,
that is part of some broader package of mutually beneficial concessions. It is
therefore entirely possible that country S will treat dividends paid to country
R differently than dividends paid to a third country T. And country R may
well treat dividends received from country S differently than dividends
received from country T.
Finally, in addition to accounting for differences in domestic taxation,
for multiple national claims of taxing jurisdiction, for different forms of cross‐
border investment and for conflicting concepts of neutrality, designing a
system of income taxation of cross‐border dividends must also recognize that
the law will effectively divide revenues among nations. What is at stake here
is not simply the effect of non‐neutralities on taxpayers but also the allocation
of tax revenues between national treasuries. For example, even if all tax rates
and bases were the same, so that capital export neutrality and capital import
neutrality could be both achieved simultaneously, the choice between
residence and source taxation would still crucially determine which country
receives the revenue from which investments.
These difficulties in international tax policy can be illustrated by a
question that occurs in many of the ECJ cases discussed below: how should
an integrated corporate‐shareholder tax system deal with cross‐border
dividends?12 The issue arises in two contexts: how should a source country
treat foreign shareholders and how should a residence country treat
corporate taxes paid abroad? If an imputation source country fails to grant
shareholder credits to foreign shareholders on outgoing dividends, incoming
investment might bear a heavier tax burden than domestic investment.
Similarly, if an imputation residence country fails to grant shareholder credits
for taxes paid abroad on foreign corporate‐source income, outgoing
investment could be taxed more heavily than domestic investment. As a
matter of national tax policy, the general tendency around the world has been
12

See generally Peter A. Harris, Corporate/shareholder Income Taxation and Allocating
Taxing Rights between Countries (1996); Treasury and ALI Integration Reports, supra note
5, at 12‐14, 183‐98, 735‐63; Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division
of the International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 Tax Law Review 565 (1992); Hugh
J. Ault, International Issues in Corporate Tax Integration, 10 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 461 (1978).
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either not to grant credits for outbound and inbound dividends or to grant
them only through bilateral treaties. Failing to allow shareholder credits
either for dividends paid to foreigners or for corporate taxes paid abroad
tends to favor domestic investment over foreign investment, and, as a tax
policy matter, this is where most countries have landed as an initial matter.
Extending credits to outgoing dividends would tend to promote
capital import neutrality and reduce tax revenues of source countries.
Extending credits to incoming dividends would tend to promote capital
export neutrality and reduce tax revenues of residence countries. The first
approach would reduce differences in treatment based of the origin of capital,
while the second would reduce differences in treatment based on its
destination.
The choice between these two approaches is certainly not obvious,
and studies commissioned by the European Commission have sometimes
recommended the first and sometimes the second.13 Both approaches,
however, cannot be implemented simultaneously unless the goal is not just
to eliminate discrimination against cross‐border income, but to tax
international income more favorably than domestic income.14 As we shall see,
the ECJ’s tax decisions have required the Court to resolve the dilemma
presented by this choice, but do not offer any coherent rationale for choosing
between the two approaches. Before turning to those decisions, we need to
13

See, e.g., EEC Comm’n, The Development of a European Capital Market 301‐302, 311‐
312(Segré Report) (Nov. 1966), (recommending imputation credits be extended to outgoing
dividends); Comm’n of the Eur. Communities, Report of the Committee of Independent
Experts on Company Taxation (Ruding Committee Report) (Mar. 1992) (recommending
staged steps to reduce corporate tax distortions, including a minimum base and rate, as well
as extension of imputation credits to incoming dividends). For other Commission studies
recommending other unified systems of corporate taxation for Europe, see Commission
Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Harmonization of Systems of Company
Taxation and of Withholding Taxes on Dividends, 1975 O.J. (C 253) 2 (recommending a
common imputation system); A.J. van den Tempel, Corporation Tax and Individual Income
Tax in the European Communities (EEC Comm’n, Approximation of Legislation Series No.
15, 1970) (van den Tempel Report) (recommending a common system of separate corporate
and individual income taxation); EEC Comm’n, The Development of a European Capital
Market EEC Comm’n, Fiscal and Fin. Comm., Report on Tax Harmonization in the Common
Market (Neumark Report) (July 8, 1962), reprinted in Tax Harmonization in the Common
Market 7 (Commerce Clearing House, Inc. ed. & trans. 1963) (recommending a common
system of split‐rate corporate taxation under which preferential rates would apply to
distributed earnings).
14
See, e.g., the example in footnote 74, infra.
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explain how the international tax system has responded to the complexities
of taxing cross‐border dividends, because that response has been invoked to
justify some of the Court’s recent decisions.
3. The Approach of the International Tax System
As a matter of jurisdiction, an important distinction arises between
source and residence countries in international taxation. A source country
may tax income arising within that country, while a residence country may
tax its residents on domestic and foreign income, subject to relief for
international double taxation. In any single nation, which can be both a
source and residence country, this translates into an important difference
between the taxation of residents (potentially on world‐wide income) and
non‐residents (on local income only).15 Although fundamental to the
international tax system, this distinction turns out to carry little weight with
the ECJ in the cases we discuss below.
Over the last eighty years, an international system for the taxation of
cross‐border income has evolved in more than two thousand bilateral tax
treaties. While there are important differences, those treaties are generally
based on the model developed by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).16 As applied to corporate‐source
income, the international tax system comprises three key elements: the treaty
provisions specifically devoted to the reduction of international double
taxation, the effect of other treaty provisions, and the impact of tax planning
by multinational corporations.
In general, source countries agree in bilateral tax treaties to mutual
reduction of source‐country withholding taxes on dividends paid to foreign
shareholders.17 In the case of dividends to corporate parent companies, the
withholding tax may be reduced to zero.
Residence countries agree to mitigate international double taxation
either by exempting foreign income or by providing a tax credit for taxes paid

15

The United States is atypical in that it taxes its citizens on their world‐wide income even
if they are not resident in the U.S..

16

OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2005 revision) [hereinafter
OECD MTC].
17
See, e.g., OECD MTC, article 10, ¶ 2.
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to the source country.18 This foreign tax credit is generally limited to the tax
due in the residence country, so that residence countries do not have to
refund taxes paid to another nation.19 In the case of direct investment, if
certain ownership thresholds are met, an indirect foreign tax credit is allowed
for taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries or sub‐subsidiaries, when the taxed
income is distributed to the parent company as a dividend.20 (The foreign tax
credit is distinct from the imputation shareholder tax credit described earlier,
but, as we shall see, cross‐border dividends can create an interaction between
the two.)
The net result of these treaty concessions is often described as
granting the corporate tax base exclusively or primarily to the source country
and the investor tax base exclusively or primarily to the residence country.21
In terms of the first example above (direct investment), country S would levy
only one level of tax (on Y’s corporate income), if it eliminated withholding
on the dividends paid to the parent company X. Country R would either
exempt X’s dividend receipts from Y or provide a credit for the taxes paid by
Y to country S. Whether or not the income originating in country S would be
taxed again when distributed as a dividend to shareholder A would depend
on how country R’s tax law dealt with economic double taxation – whether
it had integrated its corporate and individual income taxes – and, if it had
integrated, how it dealt with taxes paid to another country. In the second
example (portfolio investment), country S would also levy a tax on corporate
income in S), but any foreign tax credit provided by country R would be
limited to withholding taxes on dividends received by A.
While the preceding paragraph is accurate, it is not a complete
account of the division of the tax base between source and residence
countries, because it fails to reflect the other tax treaty provisions affecting
that division. Consider first the level of penetration into the economy of the
source country required before that country can assert jurisdiction to tax
under tax treaties. In the conventional language of international taxation, the
18

See, e.g., OECD MTC, articles 23A & 23B.
See, e.g., IRC §904 (limitation on foreign tax credit).
20
See, e.g., IRC §902.
21
E.g., Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 Duke L.J. 1021 (1997); see also Richard M. Bird & J. Scott Wilkie, Source‐ vs.
Residence‐Based Taxation in the European Union: The Wrong Question?, in Taxing Capital
Income in The European Union 78 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000) (arguing that source and
residence are not particularly useful principles for assigning tax jurisdiction).
19
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activity of nonresidents – typically employees of a foreign company – must
generally rise to the level of a permanent establishment before business income
can be taxed by the source country.22 (Most permanent establishments are
branches of foreign companies, and we use the two terms interchangeably.)
The permanent establishment threshold is hardly self‐defining and is
sometimes controversial, but if it is not met, the corporate tax base belongs
to the residence country.
Next consider the deductibility of certain payments, such as royalties.
If company X in our example has provided technology to its foreign
subsidiary Y, for which Y pays X a royalty, that royalty will generally be
deducted from Y’s income and included as income to X. Thus, if taxed at all,
this portion of Y’s income will be taxed in country R, rather than country S,
except to the extent S imposes a withholding tax on outgoing royalties.23
Similarly, to the extent X capitalized Y with debt, rather than equity,
deductible interest payment would result in Y’s production in S being taxed
in R, rather than S. Intercompany sales may also allow shifting of income
between countries through the prices agreed to by related parties. Under the
standard treaty provisions, such transfer prices must approximate the arm’s‐
length prices that would be charged in a transaction between unrelated
parties.24 But, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to identify just what such
a price would be when the only observed transfers are between related
entities, which is often the case for transfers of technology and other
intangible assets.
Treaty provisions affecting individual portfolio investment may also
affect the division of the tax base between source and residence countries.
A’s capital gains on sale of his stock in company Y will, for example,
generally be taxed in A’s country of residence, not country S, where Y is
organized and earns its income.25
Finally, consider the usual tax treaty provision that requires non‐
discrimination against foreigners.26 This turns out to be a relatively narrow
22

See, e.g., OECD MTC, articles 5 & 7. For more on the level of penetration necessary to
trigger taxation in seven developed countries, see Hugh J. Ault and Brian J. Arnold,
Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 395‐397 (2004, 2nd ed.).

23
24
25
26

See, e.g., OECD MTC, article 12.
See, e.g., OECD MTC, article 9.
See, e.g., OECD MTC, article 13.
See, e.g., OECD MTC, article 24.
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prohibition, which applies only to incoming investment in source countries.27
Accordingly, the tax treaties’ requirement of nondiscrimination does not
constrain how a country taxes either domestic or foreign investment of its
own residents. There is thus nothing in the tax treaties that prevents
imputation residence countries from denying individual shareholder credits
to incoming dividends. Moreover, the general international distinction
between the taxation of residents (which can extend to worldwide income)
and nonresidents (which is limited to income arising in the source country)
has meant that imputation source countries are also free to deny shareholder
credits to outgoing dividends paid to foreigners.
Tax planning by corporations can further affect the division of the tax
base among countries.28 Company X, for example, might prefer that the
income produced by its subsidiary Y in country S be taxed in country H, a tax
haven with very low rates. X might therefore cause Y to be organized in
country H and to use a business structure in country S that does not rise to
the level of a permanent establishment. Whether this plan will succeed will
depend on the law of country S as well as the anti‐avoidance provisions
applied by country R (and its tax treaties) to company X.29
Multinational companies often engage in tax planning to avoid
paying taxes in either the source or residence country. Consider again
deductible payments of royalties from subsidiary Y to its parent company X.
In principle, the foreign tax credit in country R should be limited to country
S withholding (if any), because no other taxes have been paid on this income
in country S. However, some nations, including the U.S., permit high and
low‐taxed foreign income to be mixed together before the application of the
tax credit limitation. Company X therefore may repatriate income from
another subsidiary in a high‐tax jurisdiction and use the resulting excess
foreign tax credits to offset any country R tax on the income originating in

27

For a more detailed analysis of these provisions, see Alvin C. Warren Jr., Income Tax
Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 Tax Law Review 131 (2000).
28
See, e.g., Richard J. Vann, Division of the International Tax Base, (manuscript, 2007)
(discussing structural flaws in the current transfer pricing rules); Brian Arnold, Jacques
Sasseville and Eric Zolt (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits Under Tax Treaties (2003)
(papers discussing how the tax treaties should respond to modern business practices).
29

See, e.g., IRC Subpart F (providing for current taxation of certain controlled foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. companies).
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country S.30 This possibility has led numerous commentators to suggest that
many American companies would experience a tax increase if the U.S.
substituted an exemption of foreign‐source dividends for its current foreign
tax credit.31
Given this brief sketch of the international tax system, we can now
return to the seven complexities inherent in the taxation of cross‐border
dividends described above and summarize how international tax policy has
responded to them:
1. Countries are not constrained in their response to the possibility
of domestic economic double taxation. They are free to adopt their
30

Suppose the tax rate is 30 percent in country R, 40 percent in country S‐1, and 20 percent
in country S‐2. Company X, which is based in R, earns 100 in both S‐1 and S‐2. The after‐tax
earnings are then repatriated to X’s headquarters in R, which taxes foreign income subject to
a foreign tax credit. If considered separately, the 60 from S‐1 should produce no R tax
because the 100 of income has already borne a higher tax in S‐1 than is applicable in R. On
the other hand, the 80 from S‐2 should produce tax of 10 in R because the S‐2 income was
taxed at only 20 percent, which is lower than the 30 percent rate applicable in R. If, however,
the foreign income is mixed together, the result is 200 of income that has borne foreign taxes
of 60, for an overall rate of 30 percent, so no additional tax is due in R. These results are
summarized in the chart below:
S‐1
S‐2
Combined
1. Income
100
100
2. Foreign tax
40
20
3. Cash dividend (1‐2)
60
80
4. R taxable income (3+2)
100
100
5. R tentative tax (30% of 4)
30
30
30(a)
20
6. R foreign tax credit
7. R final tax (5‐6)
0
10
(a) 40 foreign tax credit limited to R domestic tax of 30.

200
60
140
200
60
60
0

The foregoing example illustrates a problem with an “overall” foreign tax credit limitation.
Limiting the credit to a particular country or item of income would address that problem, but
create others. See Michael J. Graetz, Foundations of International Income Taxation 179‐216
( 2003).
31

See, e.g., Presidentʹs Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair and Pro‐
Growth: Proposals to Fix Americaʹs Tax System 104, 132‐135 (2005); Lawrence Lokken,
Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals May Be Less than Enthusiastic About the
Idea (and Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 59 Southern Methodist Law Review 751 (2006);
U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Revenue Options (February 2007).
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own variants of classical or integrated systems and to choose the
scope of imputation or dividend exclusion systems.
2. Countries are not constrained in their response to the possibility
of domestic multiple corporate taxation. They are, for example, free
to adopt (or not) group taxation or exclusions for intercorporate
dividends.
3. Countries are not constrained in their choice between exemption
and credit systems as a response to the potential for international
double taxation. They may (or may not) provide equivalent benefits
for cross‐border and domestic dividends. In particular, imputation
countries are free to deny shareholder credits to incoming or
outgoing dividends.
4. There has been no comprehensive attempt to harmonize the
results across various forms of international investment, such as
whether foreign shares are held by individuals or companies.
5. Countries are not constrained in their choice among capital
import neutrality, capital export neutrality, some combination
thereof, or some other form of neutrality.32
6. Countries are free to resolve the foregoing issues differently with
different trading partners through differing bilateral tax treaties.
While similar treatment of trading partners is nonetheless common,
the celebrated “most favored nation” clause found in trade treaties
is not an essential part of the international tax treaty network.33
7. The actual division among countries of the tax base for
transnational corporate‐source income will vary not only with
domestic law and bilateral tax treaties, but also in accordance with
the business, financial and remittance structures employed by
32

The requirement of the OECD model treaty that residence countries grant either an
exemption or a credit to eliminate double taxation of foreign income would preclude the
deduction for foreign taxes suggested by the concept called national neutrality. See note 10,
supra; OECD MTC articles 23A&23B.
33
There are some 400 most favored nation clauses in the more than 2000 bilateral tax
treaties. See Ines Hofbauer, Das Prinzip der Meistbegünstigung im grenzüberschreitenden
Ertragsteuerrecht: eine Betrachtung anhand des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts und des
Rechts der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen ( 2005).
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multinational corporations.

In light of the ECJ decisions discussed below, it is worth repeating
that these results depend not only on each countries’ domestic law and its
bilateral tax treaty provisions dealing explicitly with international double
taxation, but also on other provisions of the treaties, such as the definition of
a permanent establishment, as well as tax planning by multinational
companies.
This then is the broad tax policy context in which the ECJ is operating
when it decides cases involving cross‐border dividends. Different countries
around the world, including those in Europe, have resolved these issues
differently and even within a single country these issues have been resolved
differently at different times.34 Tax policy in this arena is always contested
and inevitably controversial.
4. The Decisions of the European Court of Justice
Before we analyze the approach that the ECJ has taken to the taxation
of cross‐border dividends, a few introductory comments are in order. First,
as we have written previously, the key inquiry in these cases is whether
cross‐border transactions are subject to more onerous tax treatment than
purely domestic transactions.35 We accordingly focus on whether and why
the Court finds such discrimination, irrespective of the fundamental freedom
34

For example, a 1991 U.S. Treasury report recommending integration of corporate and
individual taxes concluded that taxes paid to foreign countries should not be credited when
dividends are paid to individual shareholders, except in return for concessions in bilateral
tax treaties. That report pointed out that granting such credits unilaterally would cost about
$17 billion of revenue (or 19 percent of total corporate taxes) in 1992. A subsequent Treasury
proposal later that same year reversed course and urged that such credits be allowed,
presumably to attract support for the proposal from U.S. multinationals. Compare Report of
the Department of Treasury on Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems:
Taxing Business Income Once (January 1992) with Department of the Treasury, A
Recommendation for Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems (December
1992). More recently, a 2005 Presidential Panel on tax reform urged that the benefits of
integration should be limited to dividends from U.S. companies that had paid U.S. taxes, a
restriction not adopted by Congress when it enacted a dividend exclusion provision in 2003.
Compare Presidentʹs Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, supra note 31, at 124‐126 with
IRC § 1(h)(11).
35

See Graetz & Warren, supra note 3.
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or Treaty article on which it relies for the finding.36 Nor do we distinguish
here among the doctrinal categories the ECJ assigns to offenses (such as
restriction or discrimination) or to defenses (such as cohesion or
proportionality.)37
Second, although the European Council has the power to legislate (by
directive) regarding income taxation in the EU, there are very few such
directives, because tax legislation is subject to a veto by any Member State.
The only legislation directly relevant to the taxation of dividends is the
Parent‐Subsidiary Directive concerning dividends paid by subsidiaries in one
Member State to parent companies in another Member State.38 That directive
requires source countries to eliminate withholding taxes on outgoing
dividends from a subsidiary to a parent company, while resident countries
are required to exempt incoming dividends from subsidiary to parent
companies or to grant a tax credit for taxes paid by the subsidiary in the
source country.
Finally, several of the ECJ cases deal with European imputation
systems that have since been replaced with dividend exclusions. We think
that replacement makes these decisions more, rather than less, important, in
considering the ECJ’s effect on tax policy, because the Court’s jurisprudence
was a primary factor leading Member States to abandon their imputation
systems for mitigating economic double taxation.39
36

See also Richard Lyal, Non‐discrimination and Direct Tax in Community Law, 12 EC Tax
Review 68 (2003) (arguing that the ECJ income tax decisions could generally be analyzed as
discrimination cases). Mr. Lyal was the Commission’s representative before the ECJ in most
of the cases discussed in this article.
37
For a discussion of these defenses by doctrinal category, see Ruth Mason, Primer on
Direct Taxation in the European Union, 93‐114 (2005). See also Jukka Snell, Non‐
Discriminatory Tax Obstacles in Community Law, 56 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, 339 (2007) (arguing that the ECJ focuses on discrimination in tax cases, applying
a narrower test than in regulatory cases).
38
As originally enacted in 1990, the directive applied to parent companies that owned 25
percent of a subsidiary, but that percentage has been reduced to 15 percent and will decline
to 10 percent in 2009. Council Directive of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation
applicable to parent companies and their subsidiaries in different Member States
(90/435/EEC); Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 amending Directive
90/435/EEC on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and
subsidiaries of different Member States. The 2003 directive also mandated an indirect foreign
tax credit in residence countries using a foreign tax credit.
39
For more on this point, see Graetz & Warren, supra note 3, at pages 1208‐1212.
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We now turn to an analysis of the ECJ decisions concerning the
taxation of dividends. To date, there have been a dozen such decisions
involving both inbound and outbound dividends, half of which have been
handed down since 2006. Cases involving inbound dividends arise in
residence countries and concern the possibility of discrimination based on the
destination of investment. Cases involving outbound dividends arise in
source countries and concern the possibility of discrimination based on the
origin of investment. In the conventional language of international taxation,
inbound dividends raise questions of capital export neutrality, while
outbound dividends raise questions of capital import neutrality.
In order to facilitate the discussion, we have organized the decisions
into four categories. We begin with (1) the two earliest cases, both of which
involved dividends received by permanent establishments. We then consider
(2) dividends received by individual shareholders under tax legislation
designed to reduce economic double taxation, (3) cross‐border dividends
paid to corporations under imputation systems, and (4) withholding taxes on
cross‐border dividends. Readers unfamiliar with these cases may find the
chart in the Appendix useful in following the discussion. It is worth recalling
that the foreign countries in the decisions discussed below are, unless
otherwise indicated, other Member States of the European Union.40
4.1. The Early Cases
Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic (hereinafter
Avoir Fiscal),41 decided in 1986, was one of the earliest ECJ cases dealing with
income taxation. At issue was the shareholder credit under the French
imputation system. Under French law, that credit, or avoir fiscal, was
available for dividends paid by French corporations to French insurance
40

We do not discuss in this article the implications of these decisions for companies
organized outside the EU, which has been a matter of considerable interest. See, e.g., Lasartec
Geselischaft fur Stanzformen mbH v. Finanzamt Emmendingen, Case C‐492/04, May 10, 2007
(freedom of establishment does not extend to non‐member countries); Holbock v. Finanzamt
Salzburg‐Land, Case C‐157/05, May 24, 2007 (freedom of movement is applicable to incoming
dividends from a non‐member country, but the residence country legislation was subject to
a grandfather clause in the EC Treaty); Alex Cordewener, Greg Kofler & Clemens Schindler,
Free Movement of Capital: Third Country Relationships and National Law: An Emerging
Issue before the ECJ, 47 European Taxation 107 (2007).
41
Case C‐270/83, January 28, 1986.
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companies or to their French subsidiaries, but not for dividends paid by
French corporations to French branches of foreign insurance companies.
France argued that the distinction should be upheld for two reasons: First,
nonresidents are not in the same position as residents for tax purposes and,
in any event, benefit from other tax advantages not available to residents.
Second, the allocation of taxation should be left to the bilateral tax treaties.
France generally applies the territorial system described above to
eliminate international double taxation by exempting foreign business
income earned by French companies. Since both French companies and
French branches of foreign companies were therefore taxed only on French‐
source income, the ECJ found in Avoir Fiscal that it was discriminatory to
deny the latter credits available to the former. It further held that any
offsetting tax advantages under French law to nonresidents were not relevant
to that determination. Nor, according to the Court, were the tax treaties
relevant to the treatment of this item of domestic income, since the dividends
originated in the same country in which the branch operated.42
The second ECJ case on dividends did not come before the ECJ until
1999. That case, Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Finanzamt Aachen‐Innenstadt,
involved German taxation of a branch of a French company.43 Germany
denied such permanent establishments two tax advantages that were
available to German companies when they received foreign dividends: an
exemption for dividends received from non‐EU countries under a bilateral
tax treaty and an indirect foreign tax credit for taxes paid by a foreign
subsidiary.44 Germany argued that these provisions were not discriminatory
for several reasons. First, residence companies were taxed differently from
nonresidents in that Germany taxed the former on their world‐wide income
(subject to foreign tax credits), while it taxed the latter only on their German
income. Second, the tax concessions to a German company on its receipt of
42

While not litigated, it is worth noting that this kind of disadvantage to a branch of a
foreign corporation might have also been subject to challenge under the standard
nondiscrimination clause of bilateral tax treaties, unless the treaty explicitly permitted this
treatment. The Court in Avoir Fiscal also concluded that the fact that the advantage sought
could be garnered by organizing the branch operations as a French subsidiary did not justify
the discrimination against a branch, since the freedom of establishment allows nonresidents
to choose any legal form they desire.
43

Case C‐307/97, September 21, 1999.
The case also involved the exemption of certain foreign holdings for purposes of a capital
tax.
44
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dividends from abroad could be made up by German taxation of that
company’s dividends to its shareholders, but neither future remittances by
a German branch to its French headquarters company nor dividends paid by
that company would be subject to taxation in Germany. Third, the income
at issue here was foreign income, so the division of tax base in Germany’s tax
treaties should be respected.
The ECJ rejected the first argument on the grounds that domestic
companies and branches of foreign companies were in the same position for
these purposes, as Germany taxed both on dividends received. It rejected the
second argument on the grounds that other advantages of nonresident
taxation could not be used to justify this disadvantage. Germany’s final
argument was rejected with a rhetorical opposition that is found in many of
the Court’s decisions: the Member States are free to use bilateral tax treaties
to allocate taxing power, but once allocated, the exercise of allocated power
must not be discriminatory.45 Treaty benefits granted by Germany to German
companies therefore had to be extended to German branches of foreign
companies to be compatible with the EC treaty.46 According to the Court,
mandating Germany’s unilateral extension of these tax advantages would not
affect the rights of Germany’s non‐EU treaty partners.47
As illustrated by these two decisions, a holding of discriminatory
income taxation by the ECJ typically involves three steps: (1) a finding that
domestic and foreign taxpayers are in comparable positions, (2) a finding
that there is a difference in tax treatment, and (3) a finding that other
differences between domestic and foreign taxpayers are irrelevant. This
methodology has been called the “comparable internal situation test.”48 Since
both step (1) and (3) involve attributes of domestic and foreign taxpayers, the
Court’s methodology, in order to be convincing, has to provide a defensible
rationale for assigning some attributes to the first category and others to the
third. That rationale should be related to the purpose of the
nondiscrimination requirement, which is presumably to prevent Member
States from using their tax legislation to favor domestic commerce over
commerce among Member States.
45

Case C‐307/97, ¶¶ 56‐57.
Case C‐307/94, ¶ 58.
47
Case C‐307/97, ¶59.
48
Ruth Mason, A Theory of Tax Discrimination, 46 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
‐‐ (forthcoming, 2007)
46
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Within this framework, the results in Avoir Fiscal and Saint‐Gobain
depend on two key assumptions: first, that the appropriate comparison in step
(1) was with a domestic company that received the same dividends as the
branch of the foreign company, and second, that the only relevant transaction
was the receipt of those dividends. If, on the other hand, the Court had
conceptualized the relevant transaction as the stream of corporate income
from subsidiary to parent company and then on to individual shareholders,
it might have concluded that the domestic company was not comparable to the
foreign branch, because the end of the stream (dividends from each parent
company to its shareholders) was taxable by the litigating country only in the
case of the domestic company. Germany made precisely this argument in
Saint‐Gobain. The Court responded by saying that other advantages for the
foreign branch could not offset the litigated disadvantages. This, however, is
circular reasoning: such advantages are other only if they are in category (3),
rather than (1). The Court offers no explanation whatsoever for its decision
to restrict the framework for its analysis of nondiscrimination to the dividend
receipt, rather than looking to the entire stream of corporate‐source income
flowing ultimately to the shareholders. (Indeed, it is the latter that is typically
regarded as relevant by a national government in fashioning its tax policy.)
The Court thus fails to provide any rationale for its conclusion that the
nontaxability of distributions by the branch to its foreign parent is irrelevant,
rather than highly relevant, to the comparison with a domestic company.
Unfortunately, the Court’s failure to explain why it assigns some attributes to
category (1) and others to category (3) turns out to be a recurring defect in the
ECJ income tax decisions.49
These two early cases show that from the beginning, the Court has
sought to eliminate discrimination for both inbound and outbound dividends.
We now turn to how the Court has approached that enterprise for dividends
received by individuals.
4.2. Dividends Received by Individuals
4.2.1. Inbound Dividends
The ECJ has decided four cases involving foreign dividends received
by individuals under tax systems designed to reduce economic double
49

Cf. Mason, supra note 48, at – (concluding that the ECJ’s reasoning was circular in a
sample of ECJ decisions involving income taxation generally).
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taxation. In each case, the Court held that the treatment of foreign dividends
had to be conformed to that of domestic dividends to satisfy the EC Treaty.
The first such decision, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M.
Verkooijen,50 involved a simple dividend exclusion. Holland allowed
individuals an exemption for a limited amount of dividends received from
Dutch companies (on which a Dutch ?dividend tax” had been withheld), but
no such exclusion for dividends from foreign companies (which had borne
foreign, but not Dutch, withholding.) According to the Court, the Dutch
legislation was intended to reduce economic double taxation of corporations
and their shareholders and to encourage investment in Dutch shares.
The ECJ held that limiting the exclusion to dividends from domestic
companies was a violation of the EC Treaty because it had “the effect of
dissuading” Dutch investors from buying stock of companies in other Member
States and was an obstacle to the raising of capital in Holland by such
companies.51 These conclusions about causality are obviously incomplete, in
that any such consequences must be the cumulative result of the tax situation
in both the source and residence countries. In response to Holland’s argument
that its exemption should not apply to foreign dividends because its purpose
was to reduce economic double taxation in Holland, the Court responded that
there was no “direct link” between the corporate and shareholder taxes, which
it described as “two separate taxes levied on different taxpayers.”52
Given the long history of various approaches to economic and
international double taxation of corporate‐source income described above, this
response is astonishing. Under the Court’s approach, the Dutch legislation
is to be tested for discrimination by looking only at the taxation of
shareholders, with the taxation of the distributing corporation’s income flow
completely ignored. Put differently, in setting its level of shareholder taxes,
Holland is not entitled to consider whether it collects taxes on the income
stream at the corporate level. The ECJ offers no reason for classifying this
inquiry as irrelevant (category (3) in our description of the Court’s
methodology), other than its conclusory observation that corporations and
50

Case C‐35/98, June 6, 2000.
Id. at ¶¶ 34‐35. The Court relied on Directive that implemented the Treaty guarantee of
freedom of movement for capital during the relevant period. European Council Directive
88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, OJ L 178,
8.7.1988, p. 5–18.
51

52

Case C‐35/98, ¶58.
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shareholders are different taxpayers. We would have thought that a careful
inquiry into the relative tax burdens on domestic and cross‐border income
streams would at least begin by looking at the totality of taxes on each
stream.53
The second case in this group, Anneliese Lenz v. Finanzlandesdirektion für
54
Tirol, concerned Austrian legislation providing that dividends received by
individuals from domestic companies could either be taxed at a 25 percent flat
rate or, if subject to graduated rates, benefit from a rate reduction. These
benefits did not depend on Austrian corporate taxes actually having been
paid. Dividends from foreign companies were subject to taxation at the usual
graduated rates, up to a 50 percent maximum. As in Verkooijen, the Court
reasoned that such a provision had “the effect of deterring” Austrians from
buying foreign shares and made raising equity in Austria less attractive for
foreign companies than raising equity at home.55 As indicated above,
however, cross‐border tax incentives to invest at home or abroad must depend
on the corporate and shareholder tax situations in both countries. But the ECJ
held that the tax rate abroad was irrelevant because “other tax advantages”
could not offset the litigated disadvantages.56 As for considering the flow of
corporate income, the Court simply repeated that corporate and shareholder
taxes are “two distinct taxes which affect different taxpayers.”57
In response to Austria’s argument that its method of relieving
economic double taxation should not apply to foreign companies from which
no Austrian tax had been collected, the ECJ stated that both Austrian and
foreign companies might be subject to double taxation, so Austria could not
treat them differently.58 In other words, Austria was prohibited from taking
into account whether another country had collected the tax revenue on the
corporation’s income in designing its system for taxing corporate income
distributed to shareholders as dividends, at least where relief for domestic
dividends did not depend on payment of a corporate tax. According to the
53

See, e.g., Stephen Bond, Malcolm Gammie, Socrates Mokkas, Corporate Incomes Taxes
in the EU: An Economic Assessment of the Role of the ECJ (manuscript 2006) (arguing that
the tax treatment that matters for investors is the overall combination of source‐country and
residence‐country treatment).
54
55
56
57
58

Case C‐315/02, July 15, 2004
Case C‐315/02, ¶¶ 20‐21.
Case C‐315/02, ¶¶41‐43.
Case C‐315/02, ¶36.
Case C‐315/02, ¶¶30‐33.
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Court, extending lower rates to dividends from foreign companies would not
interfere with Austria’s goal of reducing double taxation on domestic corporate
income.59
To return to the Court’s discrimination methodology, dividends from
a company organized in another Member State were compared in Lenz with
dividends from a domestic company, with all other attributes (collection of
Austrian tax upstream, rate of taxation abroad, and so on) deemed irrelevant.
Once again, the Court articulates no reason for this division of attributes that
might take it beyond circular reasoning. The conclusion that corporations and
shareholders are to be analyzed separately obviously does not provide a
reason for doing so.
The final two cases involved incoming dividends under imputation
systems where shareholder credits were available for dividends from domestic
companies (which had paid corporate tax to the crediting country), but not for
dividends from foreign companies (which had not paid corporate tax to the
crediting country). In Petri Manninen,60 the Court did not ignore the link
between the Finnish shareholder and corporate taxes, as it had in Verkooijen
and Lenz. In essence, Finland had converted its corporate tax into a
withholding tax on dividends. It imposed a tax of 29 percent at both the
corporate and shareholder level, but fully credited the corporate tax to
shareholders. Distribution of a dividend that had not borne a corporate tax
equal to the shareholder credit triggered a compensatory tax of the type
described earlier. Mr. Manninen owned shares in a Swedish company and
claimed that Finland should allow him a shareholder credit for the corporate
taxes paid to Sweden. The Court agreed and held the Finnish legislation
violated the EC Treaty on the ground that the goal of eliminating Finnish
economic double taxation could be achieved by Finland’s granting credits not
only for corporate taxes paid to Finland, but also for corporate taxes paid to
other Member States!61
Prior to this 2004 decision, one might have understood the ECJ as
saying that a residence country’s provisions to reduce corporate‐shareholder
economic double taxation had to be applied to foreign dividends, without
regard to the tax situation in the source country. That is, an exemption
(Verkooijen) or lower tax rate (Lenz) available for domestic dividends had to be
59
60
61

Case C‐315/02, ¶38.
Case C‐319/02, September 7, 2004.
Case C‐319/02, ¶¶46‐54.
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extended to dividends from other Member States, regardless of whether or
how the paying corporation’s income had been taxed by the foreign country.
In contrast, the ECJ in Manninen required the residence country to adjust its
imputation system to take account of the corporate tax paid in the source
country.62 According to the Court, if, for example, the source country had
relieved economic double taxation with a dividend deduction, Finland would
have been under no obligation to extend its imputation system to foreign
dividends from that country.63 On the other hand, if the source country had
a classical corporate‐shareholder economic double taxation system, Finland
would be required to provide a shareholder credit based on the tax rate in that
country.64 This is arguably an important departure from the ECJ’s previous
refusal to consider corporate and shareholder taxes together.65 On the other
hand, the Court’s approach here may simply be a reflection of the fact that the
Finnish legislation in Manninen, unlike the Austrian legislation in Lenz, linked
the two taxes. Unfortunately, the Court provides no guidance on how its
judgment should be understood.
In any event, under Manninen, a Member State must look to the
corporate tax treatment abroad to determine whether its imputation credits
need to be extended to foreign dividends, but the Member State cannot take
into account whether it or the other Member State received the upstream taxes
that the credit was designed to offset. As usual, there is no non‐circular
explanation of why the former attribute is relevant and the latter irrelevant.
Instead, the Court simply repeats a statement found in many ECJ decisions
that a reduction in tax revenue is not a defense to discrimination.66 This
statement seems particularly unconvincing in the context of imputation, which
essentially converts part or all of the corporate tax into a withholding levy on
dividends paid to shareholders.67 Had the Finnish corporate tax been styled
62

Case C‐319/02, ¶¶34‐36.
Case C‐319/02, ¶34.
64
Case C‐319/02, ¶¶46, 54.
65
The ECJ did not go so far as the Advocate General, who had concluded that taxes on
different taxpayers could be related if they were on the same income or economic process.
Case C‐319/02, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, March 18, 2004, ¶61.
66
Case C‐319/02, ¶49.
67
For similar views, see Dennis Weber, In Search of a (New) Equilibrium Between Tax
Sovereignty and Freedom of Movement Within the EC, 34 Intertax 558, 599 (2006) (“the
Finnish corporate tax functions in the imputation system as a pre‐payment for the Finnish
income tax”); Joachim Englisch, Fiscal Cohesion in the Taxation of Cross‐Border Dividends,
63
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a withholding tax on shareholders, it is hard to imagine that the limitation of
Finnish withholding credits to Finnish withholding taxes would have been
found discriminatory by the Court.
In 2007, the ECJ reaffirmed the Manninen results in W. Meilicke v. FA
Bonn‐Innenstadt,68 by applying the same reasoning to the German imputation
system, which was similar to the Finnish legislation at issue in Manninen. In
its Meilicke judgment, the Court indicated that Lenz and Manninen had simply
confirmed the principles established by Verkooijen.69
4.2.2. Outbound Dividends
As described above, imputation may create a heavier tax burden on
both incoming dividends (if residence‐country shareholder credits are not
extended to dividends from other countries) and outgoing dividends (if
source‐country credits are not extended to foreign shareholders). Manninen
and Meilicke involved the first possibility. In 2004, the second was presented
to the Court of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), which applies the
internal market concepts of the EU to certain neighboring countries, including
Norway. In Fokus Bank v. Norway,70 the EFTA Court considered Norway’s
imputation credit system, which allowed credits to resident, but not
nonresident, individual shareholders. The credit was computed using the
shareholder’s tax rate, so dividends received by domestic shareholders were
effectively exempt. In addition, dividends to foreign, but not domestic,
individual shareholders were subject to a final withholding tax.
Relying on the ECJ decisions involving incoming dividends, the EFTA
Court held that outgoing dividends also had to pass muster under the
fundamental freedoms. This conclusion is hardly surprising, as the ECJ had
never suggested that its analysis of cross‐border dividends was limited to
incoming dividends. And the European Commission’s view has clearly been
that neither outgoing nor incoming dividends may be taxed more heavily than
domestic dividends, although it has never specified precisely what that

44 European Taxation 323 (pt 1), 353 (pt2), at 359 (2004) (“the limitation of a tax credit only
to dividends paid out by resident companies is both legitimate and proportionate”).
68
Case C‐292/04, March 6, 2007.
69
Case C‐292/04, ¶ 40.
70
EFTA Case E‐1/04, November 23, 2004.
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means.71
Given the purpose of the Norwegian legislation (avoidance of
economic double taxation), the EFTA Court held that Norway had to extend
its shareholder imputation credits to foreign, as well as domestic, shareholders
in order to achieve equivalent treatment.72 Norway argued that taxation of the
dividends in the shareholder’s residence country was relevant to determine
whether domestic and outgoing dividends were treated equivalently. Citing
the ECJ cases described above, the EFTA Court responded that discrimination
in the source country could not be remedied by a tax advantage provided in
a bilateral tax treaty or in legislation in the residence country,73 arguably
suggesting a different approach from Manninen, at least with respect to
outgoing dividends.
The details of the Norwegian legislation (imputation in form, but
functionally an exemption for domestic shareholders coupled with
withholding on dividends to foreigner shareholders) make it difficult to draw
conclusions from Fokus for more standard imputation systems. On the one
hand, Manninen and Fokus might be read together to require both source and
residence countries to grant imputation credits to cross‐border dividends,
which could make the tax burden on international investment less than that on
domestic investment.74 On the other hand, as indicated above, Manninen
71
EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: Dividend Taxation of
Individuals in the Internal Market 20 (COM 810, December 19, 2003). The Commission
argued in Fokus that failure to grant imputation credits to foreign shareholders was
discriminatory. EFTA Case E‐2/04, Report for the Hearing, ¶¶ 48‐55. In Manninen, the
Commission argued that the Finnish imputation system was flawed both because imputation
credits were not available for incoming dividends and because they were not available for
outgoing dividends. ECJ Case C‐319/02, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott ¶¶ 18, 68
(March 18, 2004). The Commission recently confirmed its view that neither incoming nor
outgoing dividends can be taxed more heavily than domestic dividends under the EC Treaty.
See note 132, infra.
72

EFTA Case E‐1/04, ¶ 30.
EFTA Case E‐1/04, ¶¶37‐38.
74
Consider the simple case of two partial imputation countries, each with a 50 percent
corporate tax, a shareholder credit for half of the corporate taxes paid, and a shareholder tax
rate of 50 percent. Assume a domestic corporation in country R that earns 100, pays 50 in
corporate taxes and distributes the remaining 50 to domestic shareholders, who are eligible
for a tax credit of 25. As shown in the table below, the corporate income of 100 will produce
total taxes of 62.50, leaving R domestic shareholders 37.50 in cash. Now consider a company
in country S that earns 100 and pays 50 in taxes to S. This company then distributes the
73
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arguably makes the residence country’s obligation conditional, depending on
whether the source country has or has not itself relieved economic double
taxation. Such conditionality would reduce the possibility of mandating lesser
taxation of cross‐border income than domestic income. In any event, we need
to defer consideration of how the ECJ might react to the individual
shareholder situation in Fokus until we discuss its decisions involving
corporate parent companies in the next section.
Since Fokus, the ECJ has decided only one case involving outgoing
corporate distributions to individual shareholders. Margaretta Bouanich v.
Skatteverket,75 decided in 2006, concerned the repurchase (or redemption) of
shares by a corporation from its shareholders. In many national tax systems,
gains on sales of shares to third parties (amounts realized on sale minus cost
basis) are taxed at lower capital gains rates than are dividends (which may be
taxed in full with no reduction for basis). Redemptions are similar both to
dividends, in that they distribute corporate cash to shareholders, and to sales
of shares to third parties, in that the seller gives up some ownership in the
corporation. The tax policy treatment of redemptions varies not only across
countries, but within countries.76 The United States, for example, taxes certain
remaining 50 to its shareholders in country R , along with a (refundable) tax credit of 25. The
final result for these shareholders will depend on how R computes its shareholder credit on
the incoming dividend. We show two illustrative possibilities below: (1) R provides the 100
of foreign corporate income the same 25 of credit it provides for 100 of domestic corporate
income; and (ii) R provides the 75 of foreign dividends (cash plus S credit) an R shareholder
credit at the same rate it provides for domestic dividends (25 of credit for every 50 of cash
receipts). In either case, the cross‐border dividend results in less total tax than the domestic
dividend, when credits are mandated for both S and R. (In the interest of simplicity, the
example assumes that S does not levy a withholding tax on the dividend. Such a tax would
change the results, but not by much, given the low level of such taxes.)
Domestic
Shareholders
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
75
76

Corporate income
Cash distribution
Refundable tax credit from S
Tax credit from R
Taxable amount in R (2+3+4)
Gross tax in R ( 50% x .5)
Tax due in R (6‐4)
After‐tax cash (2+3‐7)
Total taxes paid to S and R (1‐8)

100.00
50.00
0
25.00
75.00
37.50
12.50
37.50
62.50

Case C‐265/04, January 19. 2006.
See Ault and Arnold, supra note 22, at 299‐301.

Foreign
Shareholders
(possibility 1)
100.00
50.00
25.00
25.00
100.00
50.00
25.00
50.00
50.00

Foreign
Shareholders
(possibility 2)
100.00
50.00
25.00
37.50 (75 x 25/50)
112.50
56.25
18.75
56.25
43.75
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redemptions as dividends and others as sales.77
In Bouanich, the ECJ held that a Swedish provision taxing redemptions
by Swedish companies of stock held by foreign shareholders as dividends (at
a rate of 30 percent) violated the EC Treaty when redemptions by domestic
shareholders were taxed as sales, producing capital gains (also taxed at a rate
of 30 percent, but with basis recovery). The Court also invalidated Swedish
legislation based on the tax treaty between Sweden and France, providing that
French shareholders of Swedish shares would be taxed on redemptions at the
rate of 15 percent after deduction of the par value of the stock,78 unless
Sweden could show that the treaty provision applicable to French
shareholders was no less favorable than the Swedish legislation applicable to
Swedish shareholders.79
Sweden apparently conceded that limiting basis recovery on
redemptions to domestic shareholders violated the EC Treaty,80 but we
wonder why, in light of the differences in the tax treatment of residents and
nonresidents. Source countries do not generally tax capital gains or losses on
sales of domestic stock by foreign portfolio investors.81 Over time, the sum of
the dividends received by a Swedish shareholder from a Swedish company
plus gains and minus losses on sales of the stock will sum to the shareholder’s
total economic gain or loss on the investment.82 That is simply not true for a
foreign shareholder, who will typically be taxed in Sweden only on dividends.
Given that Sweden treats redemptions as sales,83 and that foreign shareholders
are not usually taxed on sales, extension of domestic redemption treatment to
foreign shareholders could require exempting the latter, again resulting in
more favorable treatment of cross‐border investments than domestic
investments.

77

IRC §302.
This treatment is consistent with the OECD Model Tax Treaty. See Commentary, OECD
MTC, article 10, ¶¶ 28, 31.
79
Case C‐265/04, ¶ 56.
80
Case C‐265/04, ¶¶ 24‐25.
81
Such sales may be taxed if they have some other connection to the source country, such
as relating to the activity of a permanent establishment. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 22,
at 397‐417.
78

82
83

This assumes no step‐up in basis at death, as under IRC §1014.
Ault & Arnold, supra note 22, at 301
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4.2.3. The ECJ’s Tax Policymaking
Earlier, we set forth seven basic issues that must be addressed in
formulating a neutral or nondiscriminatory system for taxing cross‐border
dividends. The ECJ’s portfolio investment cases, which involve the
intersection of economic and international double taxation, raise many of
those issues, most of which have simply been ignored by the Court. In
particular, the ECJ has refused (a) to consider (at least before Manninen)
corporate and shareholder taxes together in evaluating the burden on
corporate‐source income; (b) to take into account which country taxed
corporate income in evaluating taxation of the corporate income when
distributed to shareholders; and (c) to offer a reasoned explanation of why
only some characteristics are relevant to its findings of discrimination while
others are left out of account. The result is a series of judicial decisions that
seem arbitrary and formalistic.
Tax policy is being made through the lens of nondiscrimination by
pair‐wise comparisons that vary with the circumstances of the case. When
inbound dividends are at issue, the Court compares a resident investing
domestically with a resident investing abroad (the same comparison required
for capital export neutrality) and asks if the law at issue disfavors the latter.
If so, it is held (as in Verkooijen, Lenz and Manninen) to violate the treaties.
When outbound dividends (or a redemption) are before the ECJ or the EFTA
Court, the pair‐wise comparison shifts, and the tax on a resident investor is
compared with that on a non‐resident investor (the same comparison required
for capital import neutrality). If the latter is disfavored, treaty violations are
found (as in Bouanich and Fokus). These shareholder‐level cases might
therefore be read as requiring nondiscrimination on the basis of both the
origin and destination of investment, but any such conclusion has to be
deferred until we reach the corporate‐level decisions discussed in the next
section.
Recall the context in which these decisions are being made. There is
no harmonization of either income tax rates or bases in Europe. So a country,
such as Ireland, can have a low corporate tax rate to promote investment there
from anywhere in the world, including both domestic investment and
investment from other Member States. But no Member State can have an
integrated corporate tax system – whether in the form of imputation credits
or dividend exclusions – that favors domestic investments over investments
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in any other Member State. It must allow its resident individual shareholders
credits for corporate taxes paid to other Member States or an identical
exclusion for dividends received from anywhere in the EU. If this
requirement pushed Member States away from integrated corporate‐
shareholder taxes back toward a classical system with its economic double
taxation of corporate profits – as it has – the Court will have contributed to
widening the gap between the tax treatment of debt and equity that
integration had narrowed. It is certainly not obvious that this is good tax
policy for Europe. Given the role played by private equity firms today in
structuring leveraged corporate buyouts, the debt‐equity distinction may
prove far more important to the ultimate ownership of European companies
than a level playing field between equity investments in various Member
States.
As for the particular tax policy dilemma we posed above (the need to
choose between granting imputation credits to inbound or outbound
dividends), the EFTA Court read the ECJ decisions to require both. In order
to understand the ECJ’s own reading of its decisions in that regard, we turn
now to a series of recent cases involving corporate taxation under imputation.
The legislation reviewed by the Court in these decisions is very complex,
because it involves the potential overlap of multiple corporate taxation with
both economic and international double taxation.
4.3. Corporate Taxation under Imputation
The ECJ has decided three cases involving corporate‐level taxation
under the former United Kingdom imputation system, which had three
important attributes for our purposes.84 The first was the Advance Corporate
Tax (ACT), which was a compensatory tax, like that described above, with a
wrinkle. The usual compensatory tax, such as the former French précomte,
would be remitted by the corporation paying a dividend in order to bring
corporate tax payments up to the level assumed by the shareholder credit. The
wrinkle in the U.K. system was that ACT was always due when a company
paid dividends, but it could later be credited against the company’s regular

84

For a more detailed description of the UK legislation, see Malcolm Gammie, Pending
Cases Filed by UK courts: The ACT and FII Group Litigation, in M. Lang, J. Schuch and C.
Staringer (eds.), ECJ : Recent developments in Direct Taxation 2007 238, 244‐256 (2007).
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(or mainstream) corporate tax.85 Except for the timing, the ultimate result is the
same as under a standard compensatory tax. After all the dust settles, one tax
is paid at the company level (ACT plus mainstream tax minus ACT), for
which shareholders receive a full or partial shareholder credit.
The second important attribute was the possibility of a group election.
Under that possibility, no ACT was due on payments of a dividend by a U.K.
subsidiary to a U.K. parent company, which would pay ACT on later
dividends to its own shareholders. Such intercorporate dividends were not
taxable when received by the U.K. parent company. No group election was
available if the U.K. subsidiary’s parent company was foreign, because foreign
companies were not generally subject to U.K. tax. Dividends by a U.K.
subsidiary to a foreign parent thus always required payment of ACT, which
would offset the subsidiary’s U.K. mainstream corporate tax when due. The
foreign parent was not entitled to a shareholder credit unless a bilateral tax
treaty provided for such a credit, in which case the dividend and credit were
subject to U.K. withholding tax.
The third attribute was the treatment of a dividend from a U.K.
subsidiary to a U.K. parent company in the absence of a group election. In this
case, the subsidiary did pay ACT. The parent company was not taxed on the
dividend (called franked investment income) and could use the subsidiary’s ACT
to offset its own ACT obligations when it later paid a dividend to its
shareholders.
To summarize, a dividend paid by a U.K. subsidiary to a U.K. parent
company was subject to two possible treatments. If there was a group
election, ACT was not paid by the subsidiary, but would be remitted by the
parent company later when it paid a dividend. If there was no group election,
the subsidiary paid ACT, but the parent was not liable for ACT when it later
paid a dividend to its shareholders. In neither case was the dividend taxable
to the U.K. parent company. A dividend received by a foreign parent
company from a U.K. subsidiary, which always had to pay ACT, was also
subject to two possible treatments. In the absence of a treaty provision, the
U.K. neither taxed the dividend nor granted a shareholder credit. On the other
hand, in certain bilateral treaties, the U.K. agreed to grant a full or partial
credit, with the dividend and credit subject to U.K. withholding tax.
In a 2001 case, Metallgesellschaft Ltd and Others, Hoechst AG and Hoechst
85

Companies remained liable for a minimum corporate tax, equal to the difference between
the corporate rate and the ACT rate. See id. at 245.
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(UK) Ltd v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue and HM Attorney General,86 U.K.
subsidiaries of foreign parent companies complained that they were
disadvantaged in terms of present value, relative to U.K. subsidiaries of U.K.
parents who had made a group election, because they always had to pay ACT
and wait for the credit against mainstream tax. The ECJ held that this
differential–which ranged from 8 ½ to 17 ½ months‐‐ violated the EC Treaty.
As in Verkooijen, the Court refused to consider the taxes on corporations and
shareholders as related. Indeed, the Court insisted that “ACT is in ‘no sense’
a withholding tax on dividends but rather an advance payment of corporation
tax”87–ignoring altogether the fact that the U.K. enacted the ACT as a
mechanism to facilitate its shareholder credit system.
If, on the other hand, the corporate and shareholder taxes were
considered together, it could make perfect sense to collect ACT when
corporate income is distributed to a foreign parent (since that income is
leaving the U.K. tax system), and not to collect ACT when such income is paid
to a U.K. parent (because ACT can be collected on later distributions by the
parent). Rather than analyzing the totality of taxes on the flow of corporate‐
source income, however, the ECJ concluded that a foreign parent and a
domestic parent were in the same position, because they were both exempt
from taxation in the U.K. on dividends from U.K. subsidiaries. The Court
conceded that they were exempt for different reasons: foreign parent
companies were not subject to corporate taxation in the U.K., whereas U.K.
parent companies were not taxed to avoid multiple corporate taxation. That
difference was dismissed as irrelevant, once again with no explanation
provided for that determination.88 Given its postulated identity of position for
domestic and foreign parent companies, the Court concluded that any
difference in the taxation of a U.K. subsidiary must be discriminatory.
Remarkably, the ECJ also reasoned that subsequent repeal of the ACT
provisions meant that they must not have been an essential part of the U.K.
tax system.89 As a reason to strike down the ACT provisions, this is not only
86

Joined Cases C‐397/98 & C‐410/98, March 8, 2001. See also, Boake Allen Limited and Others
v. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, [2007] UKHL (May 23, 2007), holding that ACT paid by
U.K. subsidiaries to parent companies from outside the EU did not give rise to a claim for
compensation under either the EC Treaty (in light of a grandfather clause) or the applicable
tax treaty.
87
Joined Cases C‐397/98 & C‐410/98, ¶¶ 6, 52.
88
Joined Cases C‐397/98 & C‐410/98, ¶ 70.
89
Joined Cases C‐397/98 & C‐410/98, ¶ 74.
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a non‐sequitur, it is circular reasoning at its worst, for many commentators
report that the U.K. repealed its ACT imputation system, at least in part,
because it anticipated that the ECJ would strike it down.90
In 2006, the Court decided two additional cases regarding dividends
received by corporate parents under the former U.K. imputation system, one
involving outbound dividends (as in Metallgesellschaft) and one involving
inbound dividends. In Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue (hereinafter ACT Test Claimants), 91 foreign
parent companies of U.K. subsidiaries argued that the ACT system was
discriminatory because dividends to foreign companies did not carry
shareholder credits unless they were granted under a bilateral tax treaty.92
Unlike earlier cases, including Metallgesellschaft, in which the Court refused to
consider corporate and individual income taxes together, the ECJ here
described the dividends as potentially subject to both multiple corporate
taxation and economic double taxation.93 The Court also stated that it is for
the Member States to determine whether, and to what extent, “a series of
charges to tax” (its terminology for multiple corporate taxation) and economic
double taxation are to be avoided.94 Although Manninen held that shareholder
credits had to be granted on incoming dividends (to individuals), the Court
decided here that such credits did not have to be granted on outgoing
dividends (to corporations) because that “would mean in point of fact that that
State would be obliged to abandon its right to tax a profit generated through
an economic activity undertaken on its territory.”(emphasis added).95 Nor was
the U.K. prohibited from granting imputation credits to only some Member
States by way of bilateral treaties.96
Applying the language quoted just above to inbound dividends leads
to the conclusion that Manninen requires a Member State “to abandon its right
to tax a profit generated through economic activity undertaken” by its
90

See, e.g., Vann, supra note 7, at 66.
Case C‐374/04, December 12, 2006.
92
This was an alternative argument of the taxpayers in Metallgesellschaft, but the Court did
not reach the issue. Joined Cases C‐397/98 & C‐410/96, ¶ 97.
91

93

Case C‐374/04, ¶49.
Case C‐374/04, ¶54.
95
Case C‐374/04, ¶59.
96
Case C374/04, ¶¶ 75‐94. Nor was the U.K. precluded from limiting the benefit of these
credits to companies resident in the other Member State. Case C‐374/04, ¶92.
94
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residents, at least for individual shareholders. Reading these two decisions
together arguably leads to the conclusion the ECJ has chosen to prohibit
discrimination based on the destination, but not the origin, of investment.
Unfortunately, other cases cast doubt on that conclusion, and, in any event,
the Court fails utterly to offer a reasoned account of its choice. Beyond the
language quoted at the end of the previous paragraph, the only two
explanations the Court offers are that residence countries are best placed to
determine a taxpayer’s overall ability to pay and that the Parent‐Subsidiary
Directive requires the residence country to relieve double taxation.97 The first
simply does not engage the underlying tax policy issue, which is the division
of the tax base between source and residence countries. Nor does it explain
why administrative differences between source and residence countries
should determine fundamental rights under the EC Treaty, particularly since
the Court has regularly rejected arguments of Member States based on
administrative considerations.98 The second is disingenuous at best, because
it ignores the mandate of the Parent‐Subsidiary Directive that source countries
exempt covered dividends from withholding taxes.99
The Court’s application of its nondiscrimination methodology in ACT
Test Claimants seems particularly manipulative. The claimants argued that
U.K. and foreign parent companies were in comparable positions because both
were exempt from U.K. taxation on dividends from U.K. subsidiaries.100 That
was precisely the attribute the ECJ found relevant in Metallgesellschaft
(category 1 in our description of the Court’s methodology). Here the ECJ
classified this attribute as irrelevant and demoted it to category 3. The Court
also concluded that U.K. and foreign parent companies were dissimilar
because the U.K. could extend shareholder credits on dividends by the former,
but not the latter.101 This conclusion is puzzling in light of the Court’s rejection
in Metallgesellschaft of the argument that U.K. and foreign parent companies
are dissimilar because the U.K. can collect ACT on dividends by the former,
but not the latter.102 Its analysis here also seems inconsistent with its decision
in Bouanich, where resident and non‐resident individuals were treated by the
97
98
99
100
101
102

Case C‐374/04, ¶60.
See, e.g., Manninen, Case C‐319/02, ¶ 54.
Council Directive 90/435/EEC of July 23, 1990, article 6.
Case C‐374/04, ¶ 48.
Case C‐374/04, ¶¶ 61‐63.
Joined Cases C‐397/98 & C‐410/98, ¶¶ 45‐51.
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Court as in comparable positions. Finally, the ECJ observed that in the case
under consideration (dividends from a U.K. subsidiary to a foreign parent
company), the U.K. would be subject to the residence‐country obligation in
Manninen to extend imputation credits to foreign dividends if the foreign
parent company itself had U.K. individual shareholders.103 While true, that
observation does not help resolve the question before the Court, which is
whether there is a source‐country obligation to extend imputation credits to
outgoing dividends.
In the absence of any articulated legal basis for permitting differential
treatment by source, but not residence, countries, one suspects that the Court
may have subscribed to the view of the advocate general in this case that
international tax law gives priority to “source‐country entitlement” and so
should the ECJ.104 International tax law does not, however, constitute a
convincing rationale for requiring nondiscrimination based on the destination,
but not the origin, of corporate investment. To begin with, “source‐country
entitlement” does not begin to capture the complexity of the division of the
income tax base between source and residence countries described above.
More importantly, it makes no sense to invoke international tax law to
prohibit something that international tax law has always permitted. As we
explained earlier, residence and source countries have never been required
under international tax principles to extend shareholder credits to either
inbound or outbound dividends. International tax principles cannot therefore
provide a basis for the ECJ’s decisions requiring extension of such credits to
inbound, but not outbound, dividends.
Nevertheless, that choice seemed to be confirmed by a residence‐
country case decided the same day as ACT Test Claimants. In Test Claimants in
the FII Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (hereinafter FII Test
Claimants),105 the Court considered incoming dividends from foreign
subsidiaries to U.K. parents. As indicated above, a dividend of franked
investment income (FII) from a U.K. subsidiary to a U.K. parent would be
nontaxable to the parent, and the parent would be able to use the subsidiary’s
ACT to offset the ACT otherwise due when it paid dividends to its individual
shareholders. On the other hand, when a U.K. parent received a dividend
from a foreign subsidiary, the U.K. taxed the parent on the dividend, subject
103
104
105

Case C‐374/04, ¶¶ 64‐66.
Case C‐374/04, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, February 23, 2006, ¶51.
Case C‐446/04, December 12, 2006.

Dividend Taxation in Europe (August 31, 2007 Draft)

Page 37

to a tax credit for any foreign withholding tax and (if the U.K. parent owned
at least 10 percent of the subsidiary) allowed an indirect foreign tax credit for
corporate taxes paid to the foreign country by the subsidiary. When the U.K.
parent company distributed a dividend out of foreign income to its
shareholders, ACT would be due. In order to mitigate the burden of such
ACT, the U.K. parent could declare the dividend it paid out of foreign income
as a foreign income dividend (FID), in which case the parent company could
claim a refund for that ACT when its mainstream corporate tax was due.
Individual shareholders would not receive a tax credit, but the FID would be
treated as if it had borne taxation “at the lower [U.K.] rate.”106
In a very long and complicated opinion, the ECJ affirmed the
obligation of residence countries to eliminate international double taxation on
incoming dividends. For our purposes, there are three key holdings.107
(1) In principle, a Member State can have an exemption system for dividends
from domestic subsidiaries and tax credit system for dividends from foreign
subsidiaries, provided that foreign‐source dividends “are not subject in that
Member State to a higher rate of tax than the rate which applies to nationally‐
sourced dividends.”108

This holding indicates that exactly the same treatment need not be applied to
domestic and foreign income, as long as the effect is the same. What that
means is less than pellucid, for the Court did not specify what it meant by
equivalent tax rates. The Court did, however, apply the logic of this holding
to corporate portfolio investments, by requiring the extension of the indirect
foreign tax credit to shareholdings of less than ten percent of a foreign
corporation.109
The second key holding concerned the complex interaction of
106

Case C‐446/04, ¶ 25. The FID system was in effect from 1994 to 1999. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 26.
The Court also held that if ACT can be surrendered by a U.K. parent company to its
resident subsidiaries, ACT has to be surrenderable to nonresident subsidiaries subject to the
U.K. corporate tax as permanent establishments. Case C‐446/04, ¶¶ 132‐134. The distinction
between source and residence countries (and betweenl discrimination on the basis of the
origin and destination of corporate investment) arguably breaks down in this situation. A
U.K. parent invested abroad in a non‐U.K. subsidiary that invested in the U.K., so it is not
clear whether the U.K. is the source or residence country with respect to corporate
investment.
107

108
109

Case C‐446/04, ¶¶ 49‐57.
Case C‐446/04, ¶74.
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multiple corporate taxation, economic double taxation, and international
double taxation:
(2) The EC Treaty was violated when a U.K. parent company receiving
dividends from a U.K. subsidiary could use ACT paid by the latter to reduce
its own ACT liability on distributions to its shareholders, but a U.K. parent
company receiving dividends from a foreign subsidiary could not reduce its
own ACT liability by the amount of foreign taxes paid by the subsidiary.110

Evaluating this holding requires unpacking the relationship among
ACT, the foreign tax credit, and the shareholder imputation credit. Consider
first a purely domestic case, with a 30 percent corporate tax rate, in which a
domestic subsidiary earns 100, pays ACT (and mainstream corporate tax) of
30, and distributes 70 to its parent company as franked investment income.
The dividends are nontaxable to the parent company, which pays no further
ACT on distributions to its individual shareholders. The individual
shareholders are taxed on 100 of income, but benefit from an imputation
credit, which we assume to be 30 in this example. If the shareholder’s tax rate
is 30 percent, he ends up with 70 after all taxes. The U.K. has collected one tax
of 30 on the domestic corporate income stream of 100. The parent’s ability to
credit its subsidiary’s ACT avoids multiple corporate taxation, while the
individual shareholder’s imputation credit avoids economic double taxation.
Now consider a foreign subsidiary of a U.K. parent, which earns 100
and pays 30 in the foreign country. On receipt of 70 in cash, the U.K. parent
company has taxable income of 100, but owes no taxes after application of the
indirect foreign tax credit, which avoids international double taxation and
multiple corporate taxation. What should then happen on distribution by the
parent company of this foreign‐source income to its individual shareholders?
Under the U.K. legislation (and most other imputation systems), 30 of ACT
would be payable. Otherwise, the shareholder would receive a U.K. tax credit
for 30 of taxes not collected by the U.K. due to the foreign tax credit at the
company level. Given the foreign tax credit, there would be no mainstream
corporate tax for the 30 of ACT to offset, so that amount was often called
surplus ACT. In effect, collecting ACT at this point restores international and
economic double taxation when the income is distributed to individual
shareholders. By requiring the parent company to offset its ACT with the
110

Case C‐446/04, ¶¶ 90‐94
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foreign taxes paid by its subsidiary, the ECJ is effectively requiring the U.K.
parent to pass the corporate foreign tax credit through to its shareholders.
It is not at all clear that the Court saw these relationships when it
stated “the ACT payable by a United Kingdom‐resident company is nothing
more than a payment of corporation tax in advance”(emphasis added).111 As
in Metallgesellschaft, the Court seems to be analyzing the relevance of the ACT
only at the corporate level.112 At one point, the Court uses its formula for
multiple corporate taxation to describe the ACT as “a national measure which
is designed to avoid a series of charges to tax on distributed profits.”113 By
ignoring the ultimate effect on shareholder‐level taxes of both ACT and the
corporate foreign‐tax credit, the ECJ is able to find a cash flow advantage for
domestic dividends in that ACT is due on the distribution of foreign
dividends, subject to later crediting against mainstream tax.114
The third key holding is an example of the proverb that “no good deed
goes unpunished”:
(3) The FID regime violated the fundamental freedoms because (a) U.K.
parent corporations receiving foreign dividends would have to wait for a
refund of ACT until it owed mainstream tax, and (b) shareholders receiving
FIDs would be effectively taxed at a standard lower rate, rather than taxed
subject to a refundable imputation tax credit.

The FID regime was an attempt by the U.K. to reduce (or eliminate) the
additional burden on incoming foreign income that the Court eventually
invalidated in holding (2). Rather than directly passing through the corporate‐
level foreign tax credit to individual shareholders, the U.K. instead taxed those
shareholders at a lower rate on FID and refunded ACT paid by the
distributing corporation.115 The ECJ found these provisions incompatible with
111

Case C‐446/04,¶88.
Cf. Case C‐446/04, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, February 23, 2006, ¶ 5
(under imputation systems, the corporation tax serves as a “prepayment for all or part of the
shareholder income tax”).
113
Case C‐446/04, ¶91
114
Case C‐446/04, ¶¶89‐94.
115
For other proposals to approximate the effect of passing though the foreign tax credit
by providing an exemption for shareholders, see the ALI Report, supra note 8; C. John Taylor,
Approximating Capital‐Export Neutrality in Imputation Systems: Proposal for a Limited
Exemption Approach, 57 IBFD Bulletin 135 (2003).
112
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the EC Treaty, because they failed to treat foreign income identically with
domestic income.
To recapitulate, reading ACT Test Claimants and FII Test Claimants
together suggests that the Court has decided that residence, but not source,
countries must relieve the international double taxation of dividends, at least
when paid to corporate shareholders under an imputation system. If the
approach of these two decisions were applicable to dividends paid to
individual shareholders under imputation, the ECJ’s jurisprudence would
reject the analysis of Fokus, even though neither of these recent ACT decisions
mentions that EFTA case.116 In the conventional language of international tax
policy, the ECJ would have chosen to enshrine capital export neutrality, but
not capital import neutrality, as a fundamental freedom.117 This conclusion is
uncertain, however, since the Bouanich decision (involving redemptions),
decided just eleven months before ACT Test Claimants, does require the source
country to make the same concessions to foreign and domestic shareholders.
In any event, once the ECJ’s assertion of source entitlement is put
aside, no substantial reason can be found in Court’s decisions for its apparent
choice to impose a heavier burden on residence countries – if indeed that is its
choice. Understanding the potential scope of that burden requires
consideration of two final decisions, both concerning withholding taxes.
4.4. Withholding Taxes
In late 2006, the ECJ decided two cases involving withholding taxes on
dividends paid to foreign shareholders. (Recall that, in the international
context, withholding taxes are, in fact, final taxes imposed by source countries
on dividends paid to foreign shareholders. Reducing the level of these taxes
116

The Judge Advocate in ACT Test Claimants indicated that he disagreed with the
approach of the EFTA Court because it did not take into account the relevant tax treaty. Case
C‐374/04, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, February 23, 2006, footnote 83. As noted
above, Fokus involved both imposition of a withholding tax and failure to extend imputation
credits on outgoing dividends to individual shareholders. The U.K. system in ACT Test
Claimants involved the latter, but not the former, but the EFTA Court’s analysis in Fokus does
not turn on the distinction.
117
Cf. Kristina Stahl, Dividend Taxation in a Free Capital Market, 6 EC Tax Review 227
(1997) (arguing for EU legislation extending shareholder credits for individual portfolio
investors to foreign income, but not foreign shareholders, to implement capital export
neutrality).
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is an important function of bilateral tax treaties.) The first case concerned
inbound dividends, while the second involved outbound dividends.
Mark Kerckhaert and Bernadette Morres v. Belgium concerned individual
shareholders in Belgium who received dividends from a French company.118
Pursuant to the French‐Belgian tax treaty, the Belgian shareholders received
the French shareholder credit (avoir fiscal) and were subject to a French
withholding tax on the sum of the cash dividend and the credit. Under
Belgian law, all dividend receipts, whether domestic or foreign, were subject
to taxation at the rate of 25 percent. The shareholders argued that their French
dividends were subject to higher taxation than domestic dividends, because
Belgium did not provide a credit for the French withholding tax. The ECJ held
that Belgium had not violated the EC treaty because it treated domestic and
foreign dividends identically. The additional burden on cross‐border
dividends resulted “from the exercise in parallel by two Member States of
their fiscal sovereignty.”119
We have several comments on Kerckheart. First, to our way of
thinking, virtually every decision discussed in this article involves the
exercise in parallel by two Member States of their fiscal sovereignty. That
is precisely what produces the interactions among multiple corporate
taxation, economic double taxation and international double taxation at
issue in these cases.
Second, if Kerckhaert is to be taken as a definitive statement of the
ECJ’s views, Member States apparently may, but need not, reduce
international double taxation by a bilateral tax treaty or domestic
legislation.120 Indeed, the Advocate General’s Opinion, reaching the same
result, explicitly states that residence countries are under no obligation to
eliminate international double taxation, but (citing the Verkooijen, Lenz and
Manninen cases) they must extend domestic provisions reducing economic
double taxation to foreign dividends.121 This means that if the greater tax
118

Case C‐513/04, November 14, 2006.
Case C‐513/04, ¶20.
120
Case C‐513/04, ¶¶21‐23. Whether Member States are obligated to relieve international
double taxation has been a matter of some dispute, with varying views about whether it
would be the obligation of source or residence countries to provide the relief. See, e.g.,
Michael Lang, Double Taxation and EC Law, in Reuven S. Avi‐Yonah, James R. Hines Jr. and
Michael Lang (eds.), Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the European Court of
Justice and the US Supreme Courtʹs Tax Jurisprudence (forthcoming, 2007).
119

121

Case C‐513/04, Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, April 6, 2006, ¶ 34.
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burden on investments by a resident of one Member State in companies of
another Member State is due to the resident country’s decision to integrate
its corporate and shareholder taxes, it violates the EC treaty, but if the
greater burden is due to the imposition by the source country of a (final)
withholding tax on dividends paid to foreigners, no treaty violation occurs.
We cannot see how this distinction advances either the economic integration
of Europe or the tax policies of its Member States. If the ECJ’s concern is
with the elimination of tax barriers to the free movement of capital within
Europe, as the Treaty’s text suggests, it is difficult to understand why it
should matter whether such barriers arise from economic or international
double taxation.
Third, Kerckhaert again poses the question whether the ECJ fully
understands the structural similarity of dividend withholding and corporate
imputation. Under Manninen, the Court required a residence imputation
country to provide individual shareholder credits for inbound dividends.
Suppose, however, that a residence country repealed its 30 percent corporate
tax along with its full imputation credit and substituted refundable
withholding of 30 percent on domestic dividends. The effect on domestic
dividends received by domestic shareholders would be unchanged. In both
cases, payment of a cash dividend of 70 would result in taxable income of
100 and a credit of 30 at the shareholder level.122 Since these provisions
would produce essentially similar results, consistency would presumably
require the ECJ to hold that enactment of such domestic withholding
required the residence country to grant shareholder credits for a foreign
taxes. Alternatively, adoption of domestic withholding might require
domestic credits for foreign withholding. Neither decision seems likely to
us, as there is no indication that the Court thinks of imputation and
withholding as functional equivalents under any circumstances.
We do not mean, by raising these questions, to criticize the ECJ for
failing to comprehend a rather subtle tax policy relationship. Our Supreme
Court would be unlikely to do any better. Such an analytical shortcoming
seems inevitable when complex tax policy decisions come to be decided by
a court that uses a single criterion such as nondiscrimination as the exclusive
touchstone for the resolution of those issues.
122

Any difference in timing due to retention of earnings at the company level could be
reduced by requiring a minimum withholding payment each year equal to 30 percent of
corporate income.
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The second international withholding case, Denkavit Internationaal
BV et Denkavit France SARL v. Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de
l’Industrie,123 involved outbound dividends paid by a French subsidiary to
a Dutch parent company prior to the effective date of the Parent‐Subsidiary
Directive. Under French law, dividends to foreign parent companies were
subject to a final withholding tax at the rate of 25 percent (reduced to 5
percent by treaty), while dividends paid to domestic parents were almost
fully exempt from tax. The ECJ held that this distinction violated the EC
Treaty. The France‐Netherlands tax treaty provided that Holland could tax
such dividends, subject to a tax credit for French withholding. (In fact,
Dutch legislation exempted such dividends.) France argued that the
bilateral tax treaty should be respected as a means of allocating taxes on
dividends between the two Member States. The Court rejected this
argument, on the ground that neither the tax treaty nor the Dutch legislation
remedied the higher tax burden in France of dividends paid to foreign
parent companies.124
As noted above, the ECJ in Manninen held that the residence
country’s obligation to extend imputation credits to incoming dividends was
conditional on the source country not having already eliminated
international and economic double taxation. In contrast, the EFTA Court in
Fokus made the source country’s obligation to extend such credits
mandatory, without regard to the situation in the residence country. The
ECJ’s language in Denkavit is unclear on the question of conditionality.
Some commentators have concluded that the Court adopted an “overall”
approach, as in Manninen, while other commentators read the decision as
applying a “per country” approach, as in Fokus.125 Assume for a moment
that Denkavit should be read as creating an obligation to extend a
withholding exemption on domestic dividends to outgoing dividends only
where no credit is available in the residence country. Now consider
Manninen and Denkavit together. Does the combined logic of those decisions
123

Case C‐170/05, December 14, 2006.
The Court seemed to suggest that a different result might obtain when the residence
country did grant a unlimited credit, Case C‐170/05, ¶46.
125
Cf. Frans Vanistendael, Denkavit Internationaal: The Balance Between Fiscal Sovereignty
and the Fundamental Freedoms? 16 European Taxation 210 (2007) (arguing that the ECJ has
adopted a “per country” approach) with Gerard Meussen, Denkavit Internationaal: The
Practical Issues, 16 European Taxation 244 (2007) (arguing that the ECJ has adopted an
“overall”approach).
124
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create the possibility that the source country’s obligations would depend on
the residence country’s resolution of its obligations, which would in turn
depend on the source country’s resolution of its obligations, and so on?
Denkavit, which held that a withholding exemption must be extended
to dividends paid to foreign parent companies, was handed down two days
after ACT Test Claimants, which held that shareholder credits need not be
extended to dividends paid to foreign parent companies. The ACT Test
Claimants decision was justified on the ground of preserving source‐country
taxation, but that rationale would seem equally applicable to Denkavit,
which required the source country to forgo tax.
The ECJ seems to distinguish these two cases on the basis that
Denkavit involved a shareholder‐level tax while the tax at issue in Test
Claimants Class IV was a corporate‐level tax.126 But this, once again, seems
to misunderstand the relationship between withholding and imputation,
here with regard to outgoing dividends. We offer two final examples of that
relationship. (In the interest of simplicity, we assume that there is no
bilateral tax treaty to be taken into account.)127 Consider first a source
country that is deciding among three tax policies. The first policy would
impose a corporate tax of 30 percent on operating subsidiaries, with a full
imputation credit for domestic, but not foreign, parent companies. The
second would impose no corporate tax on operating subsidiaries, but a
withholding tax of 30 percent on dividends to foreign, but not domestic,
parent companies. The third would impose no corporate tax on operating
subsidiaries, but a withholding tax of 30 percent on dividends paid to both
foreign and domestic parent companies. As shown in the table below, the
foreign parent would receive 70 net of source country taxes in each case,
126

Case C‐170/05, ¶¶ 34‐41.
The ECJ discussed tax treaties in a number of the cases discussed in this article. See Avoir
Fiscal (Case, C‐270/83, 1986) (treaty did not apply to income in the case); St. Gobain (Case C‐
307/97, 1999) (mandating extension of benefits under treaties with non‐Member States to a
French permanent establishment); Metallgesellschaft (Case C‐97/98, 2001) (based on its decision
on exemption, Court did not need to decide treaty issue); Bouanich (Case C‐265/04,
2006)(legislation based on treaty violates EC Treaty unless national court finds that foreign
investor is treated no worse than domestic investor); ACT Test Claimants (Case C‐374/04,
2006): (overall balance of treaties respected, including limitations on benefits and absence of
most favored nation clause); Kerckhaert (Case C‐513/04, 2006)(treaty not in issue, because
superceded by Member State legislation); Denkavit (Case C‐170/05, 2006) (treaty did not
remedy additional burden on outgoing dividends, apparently because foreign tax credit in
country was subject to the standard limitation).
127
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while the domestic parent would receive taxable income of 100, composed
of either 100 in cash or 70 in cash plus a tax credit of 30.128

Policy 1
Policy 2
Policy 3

Foreign Parent
70 in cash
70 in cash
70 in cash

Domestic Parent
70 in cash, 30 in tax credit (imputation)
100 in cash, 0 in tax credit
70 in cash, 30 in tax credit (withholding)

As far as we can tell, the first policy would be permitted by ACT Test
Claimants, the second would be prohibited by Denkavit, and the third
permitted by Denkavit. Given the essential similarity of results under the
three policies, this is a set of outcomes that makes no sense to us either as a
matter of tax policy or as an interpretation of the EC Treaty.
Our last example involves individual, rather than corporate,
shareholders. A source country would like dividends distributed by
domestic companies to domestic individual shareholders to bear an overall
tax burden of 20 percent, while those distributed to foreign individual
shareholders would bear an overall source‐country tax burden of 30 percent.
One way to accomplish that goal would be to levy a corporate tax of 20
percent, exempt dividends received by domestic shareholders, and impose
non‐refundable withholding of 12.5 percent on dividends paid to foreign
shareholders. Domestic shareholders would receive 80 in cash, while
foreign shareholders would receive only 70.129 Given the ECJ’s holdings in
Bouanich (lower taxation of redemptions to domestic individual shareholders
must be extended to foreign individual shareholders) and Denkavit
(withholding exemption for domestic corporate shareholders must be
extended to foreign corporate shareholders), we think it likely that the Court
would hold that these provisions violated the EC Treaty.
Now consider an alternative means of accomplishing the same goal:
corporate income is taxed at 30 percent, domestic individual shareholders
are taxed on dividends at 20 percent subject to a refundable imputation
credit of 30, and foreign shareholders neither benefit from the imputation
128

Any difference in timing due to retention of earnings at the parent company level could
be reduced by requiring a minimum withholding payment each year equal to 30 percent of
corporate income.
129

A dividend to a foreign shareholder would bear 10 in withholding taxes (i.e., .125 x 80),
yielding an after‐tax return of 70.
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credit nor suffer the detriment of a withholding tax. As in the previous
paragraph, foreign shareholders would receive 70, and domestic
shareholders would receive 80, net of all taxes.130 The ECJ’s decision in ACT
Test Claimants (shareholder credits need not be extended to foreign corporate
shareholders), as well as its apparent rationale (source‐country primacy)
suggests that the Court would not require the extension of imputation
credits on outgoing dividends to individual shareholders. The EFTA’s
holding in Fokus arguably requires such an extension, but the ECJ has so far
manifested no inclination to endorse that approach, which would not be
consistent with source‐country primacy. Once again, different results in the
two hypotheticals makes no sense to us as a matter of tax policy or treaty
interpretation.
Finally, the ECJ’s two recent withholding decisions, Kerckhaert and
Denkavit, provide additional reasons for caution in concluding that ACT Test
Claimants and FII Test Claimants should be read to prefer capital export
neutrality over capital import neutrality.131 Kerckhaert declined to require
crediting of foreign taxes by a residence country, while Denkavit required a
source country to extend withholding exemptions to foreign shareholders.
5. Conclusions
As should be evident by now, there are considerable uncertainties
regarding the scope of the decided ECJ cases, and additional dividend cases
are in the Court’s pipeline.132 In particular, the Court has not provided clear
130

A domestic shareholder would be taxed on 100, yielding a pre‐credit tax of 20, a net tax
credit of 10, and an after‐tax return of 80. See note 5, supra.
131
See the text supra at note 116.
132
Undecided ECJ cases involving cross‐border dividends include: Amurta v. Inspecteur van
de Belastingtionst, Case C‐79/05 (Dutch refundability of domestic, but not foreign
withholding); Staatsscretaris van Financien v. Orange European Smallcap Fund, Case C‐194/06
(Dutch restriction on tax concessions for outgoing dividends); and Hamburg‐Am Tierpark v.
Burda, Case C‐284/06 (German compensatory withholding on outgoing dividends from a
subsidiary). The Commission has also recently announced infringement proceedings
against many Member States with respect to both inbound and outbound dividends:
Commission requests Belgium to end discriminatory taxation of inbound dividends
(IP/06/l045, 20 July 2006); Commission requests Belgium, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands and Portugal to end discriminatory taxation of outbound dividends (IP/06/1060,
25 July 2006); Commission requests Greece to end discriminatory taxation of dividends from
foreign companies (IP/06/1410, 17 October 2006); Commission decides to refer Belgium,
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guidance regarding the implications for individual shareholders of its
decisions involving shareholders that are corporations, and vice versa. And
the European Commission continues to challenge differences in taxation of
both inbound and outbound dividends.133 Nonetheless, the ECJ’s dividend
decisions through the summer of 2007 may be summarized as follows,
starting in the upper‐right quadrant of the table in the Appendix and
proceeding clockwise:
1. Individual shareholder provisions designed to reduce domestic
economic double taxation (whether by exemption, rate reduction,
or imputation credits) must be extended by residence countries to
dividends from foreign companies (at least where the source
country has not itself eliminated economic double taxation).
Shareholder credits, however, need not be given for foreign
withholding on dividends (as least where there is no similar
domestic withholding).
2. Provisions that are designed to reduce multiple corporate
taxation and international double taxation (such as dividend
exemptions and the foreign tax credit) must be extended by
residence countries to branches of foreign parent companies.
Likewise, provisions designed to reduce multiple corporate
taxation and economic double taxation (such as exemptions from
compensatory taxes and shareholder imputation credits) must be
extended by residence countries to dividends from foreign
subsidiaries.
3. Exemptions from withholding and compensatory taxes designed
to reduce multiple corporate taxation must be extended by source
countries to foreign parent companies, but shareholder imputation
credits designed to reduce economic double taxation need only be
extended to domestic branches of foreign parents.
Spain, Italy, The Netherlands, and Poland to the Court over discriminatory taxation of
outbound dividends and asks Latvia to end such discriminatory taxation (IP/07/66, 22
January 2007); Commission decides to refer Belgium to the Court over discriminatory
taxation of inbound dividends (IP/07/67, 22 January 2007); Commission asks nine member
states for information on discriminatory taxation of dividends and interest paid to foreign
pension plans (IP/07/616, 7 May 2007); Taxation of outbound dividends: Commission takes
steps against Austria, Germany, Italy and Finland (IP/07/1152, 23 July 2007).
133

Id.
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4. Domestic capital gains taxation of redemptions, and perhaps
domestic shareholder credits designed to reduce economic double
taxation, must be extended by source countries to foreign
individual shareholders.

Each of the statements in the summary above embodies a complex
tax policy judgment. Many, if not most, are contrary to the decisions that
have emerged from Member State legislative processes and bilateral tax
treaty negotiations. They substantially inhibit the flexibility of European
Member States to address the vexing issues of multiple corporate taxation,
economic double taxation and international double taxation. It is
impossible, in our view, to identify consistent tax policy norms that would
explain these results. In practice, these ECJ decisions have driven the
European Member States away from imputation credits and toward
dividend exclusions as a way to alleviate economic double taxation. Such
a choice would normally turn on such tax policy considerations as
compliance and administrative costs, and whether the Member State views
corporate or shareholder tax rates as more appropriate for dividend
income,134 considerations that are completely absent from the ECJ’s
determinations. Moreover, by insisting that foreign and domestic dividends
be treated the same, the ECJ has made it more expensive to eliminate or
reduce economic double taxation, thereby reducing the likelihood (or extent)
that Member States will do so, and enlarging the differences in taxation of
debt and equity. It is certainly not obvious that the resulting tax policy for
Europe is superior to the imputation systems that the ECJ has effectively
eliminated.
Putting tax policy aside, is there any principled basis on which the
Court’s dividend decisions can be explained? We consider five possibilities.
First, as we describe above, the ostensible nondiscrimination
jurisprudence of the ECJ fails to provide such a principled basis, because the
Court consistently fails to explain why some characteristics, but not others,
are relevant to its nondiscrimination inquiry. As we have noted, that inquiry
is often resolved by appealing to a stock of rhetorical oppositions (such as
comparable versus noncomparable attributes and exercise versus allocation

134

See generally Michael J. Graetz and Alvin C. Warren Jr., Integration of Corporate and
Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction, 84 Tax Notes 1767 (September 27, 1999).
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of tax jurisdiction).135 These sorts of abstract, rhetorical oppositions in
judicial opinions have explanatory power only if they can be connected with
concrete decisions that cannot otherwise be elucidated. We cannot make
such a connection in the cases discussed above.136 Consider once again the
differential treatment of withholding and imputation credits. None of the
Court’s rhetorical oppositions elucidate that distinction, which seems to turn
on conceptualizing the withholding tax as a separate shareholder‐level levy.
Second, while contradictory in this regard, the ECJ’s most recent
dividend cases seem to emphasize a principle of source‐country primacy (at
least with respect to corporate‐level taxes) in that greater constraints have
been placed on residence countries.137 The Court also often analyzes the
corporate and shareholder taxes as separate levies. Putting those two
tendencies together might lead to the conclusion that the results displayed in
the Appendix roughly reflect the international tax system’s assignment of the
corporate tax to the source country and the investor tax to the residence
country. From this perspective, ACT Test Claimants should not be read as
precluding adoption by the ECJ of the result in Fokus, since the latter involved
a shareholder, not a corporate, tax. This approach necessarily requires
classification of tax attributes as relating to either corporate or shareholder
taxation. Some of the Court’s decisions seem to classify ACT as an attribute
of corporate taxation, while others classify imputation credits and
withholding as attributes of shareholder taxation. The fundamental
conceptual problem with this approach is, as we have argued throughout this
article, that corporate and shareholder taxes are inextricably related, because
they are levied at different points on the flow of corporate income. Moreover,
135

For examples, see St. Gobain, Case C‐307/94 (1999), ¶¶ 56‐57; Bouanich, Case C‐265/04
(2006), ¶¶ 49‐50; ACT Test Claimants, Case C‐374/04( 2006),¶¶ 52,79,81,85; Denkavit, Case C‐
170/05 (2006), ¶¶ 32,37,43,44.
136
Advocate Geelhoed proposed another set of rhetorical distinctions, but it has not been
adopted by the Court. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Test Claimants IV,
Case C‐374/04, ¶¶ 36‐57. In particular, “true” restrictions (violative of EC Treaty) are
distinguished from “quasi” restrictions (not violative) due to administrative burdens,
disparities (differences between tax systems) or division of the tax base (due to the
overlapping jurisdiction of source and residence countries).
137
See also Finanzant Offenbach am Main‐and v. Keller Holding Gmbtt, Case C‐471/04,
(February 23, 2006) (holding a residence country could not deny financing deductions for
nontaxable dividends from a foreign subsidiary when such deductions were available for
nontaxable dividends from domestic subsidiaries).
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if these two tendencies are indeed responsible for the direction the Court is
moving, the ECJ has failed to explain why source‐country primacy and
separation of corporate and shareholder taxation should be imposed on the
Member States as a matter of judicial interpretation of the EC Treaty.138 Nor
can international tax practice be rationally invoked to prohibit legislation,
such as that struck down in Manninen and Meilicke, which is clearly permitted
under international tax practice.
Third, the summary of ECJ holdings above is generally consistent
with the Parent‐Subsidiary Directive in the sense that residence countries
seem to bear a greater burden in reducing international double taxation of
corporate‐source income. But the Parent‐Subsidiary Directive is a very
limited, precise document, which provides no basis for the ECJ decisions
involving, for example, individual shareholders. Indeed, as the Court has
indicated, that document explicitly excludes imputation systems from its
scope.139 It is also worth emphasizing that the Parent‐Subsidiary Directive,
and the revisions to it, resulted from a lengthy political process that produced
unanimous consent from the Member States.
Fourth, before Manninen, it might have been possible to argue that the
Court was pursuing a principle favored by some commentators, which would
have restricted the discrimination inquiry to the tax situation in a single
country.140 A particularly stringent version of this approach would determine
whether a taxing provision is neutral with respect to incoming and outgoing
investment on the assumption that both countries have the same tax system

138

Cf. Peter J. Wattel, Corporate tax jurisdiction in the EU with respect to branches and
subsidiaries, 12 EC Tax Review 194, 199 (2003) (arguing that there is no basis for source‐
country entitlement in the EC Treaty).
139
Art. 7.
140
See, e..g, Ian Roxan, Assuring Real Freedom of Movement in EU Direct Taxation, 63
Modern Law Review 831, 873 (2000) (proposing a cross‐migration framework for identifying
prohibited taxation of transborder income); Wolfgang Schön, Tax Competition in Europe the
Legal Perspective, 9 EC Tax Review 90, 97‐99 (2000) (arguing that the EC Treaty requires only
that a country establish capital import neutrality within its borders and “not unreasonably
hinder” exportation of capital, whether monetary, real, or human); Servaas van Thiel,
The Future of the Principle of Non‐discrimination in the EU: Towards a Right to the Most
Favored Nation Treatment and a Prohibition of a Double Burden?, in Comparative Fiscal
Federalism: Comparing the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Courtʹs Tax
Jurisprudence (2007, Reuven S. Avi‐Yonah, James R. Hines Jr. and Michael Lang , eds.).
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and rates.141 At least since Manninen, however, the Court has been willing to
look beyond the borders of the litigating Member State in considering income
tax provisions.142
Finally, some might be tempted to read the decisions as serving the
Commission’s campaign to harmonize Europe’s corporate tax provisions. On
this view, the invalidation of national tax provisions by the ECJ facilitates
their later harmonization by the Commission. Deciding cases with this goal
in mind would obviously exceed the Court’s judicial role as arbiter of the EC
Treaty. We see no reason to impugn the professionalism of the ECJ, nor any
evidence that the Court considers itself a mere amanuensis of the
Commission in these decisions.143
In the end, we can identify no principled basis for the array of
decisions discussed in this article. We are thus left with the explanation that
the ECJ, encouraged by the Commission, has embarked on a mission to
require nondiscrimination on the basis of both the origin and the destination
of corporate investments yielding dividends. As we demonstrated in our
earlier article, this is ultimately an impossible task in the absence of fully
141

See, e.g., van den Tempel Report, supra note 13, at 37. This approach is similar to the
“internal consistency test” sometimes applied by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine
whether state tax laws are discriminatory. For an argument that the ECJ should replace its
comparable internal situation test with the Supreme Court’s version of internal consistency,
see Mason, supra note 48; see also Georg Kufer & Ruth Mason, Kerckhaert & Morres: A
European “Switch in Time?” 14 Columbia Journal of European Law – (forthcoming, 2007)
(applying internal consistency to argue that Kerckhaert was wrongly decided); Walter
Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?: Reflections on an Evolving Commerce Clause
Restraint on State Taxation, ‐– Tax Law Review‐‐ (forthcoming, 2007) (tracing the
development of the internal consistency test in the U.S. Supreme Court).
142
The Court has also looked beyond the litigating Member State in non‐dividend income
tax cases. See, e.g., Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (HM Inspector of Taxes), Case C‐
446/03, December 13, 2005 (holding that whether a residence country had to allow deduction
of losses of foreign subsidiaries against income of a domestic parent company depended on
the treatment of those losses in the source country); Finanzamt Köln‐Alstadt v. Roland
Schumacker, Case C‐279/93, February 14, 1995 (German taxation of income of Belgian non‐
resident had to take into account total income).
143

The Court’s dividend decisions, including ACT Test Claimants, are generally consistent
with the views expressed by the Commissions’ representative before the ECJ. On the other
hand, Communication 810 (2003), supra note 71 at ¶3.2.4, suggests that the Commission
would regard Kerckhaert as wrongly decided. The Commission also argued that the legislation
in Fokus violated the fundamental freedoms, a position that the ECJ has not rushed to
endorse. Report for the Hearing, Fokus, EFTA Case E‐1/04, ¶¶ 48‐55.
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harmonized income taxes throughout Europe. Not surprisingly, the Court
has retreated somewhat and seems to have found that it had to choose
between the two criteria. In some of the dividend cases, it seems to have
chosen the latter by imposing higher burdens on residence countries. But
there are no grounds for that choice in the EC Treaty, nor has the Court
articulated any.
Our conclusion is thus that the Court’s dividend jurisprudence fails
to hold together substantively, functionally and rhetorically. Substantively,
there is no basis in the EC Treaty for choosing source over residence taxation
(if the Court has indeed made that choice). Functionally similar tax
provisions, such as withholding and imputation, are treated differently, due
to the Court’s insistence on a formalistic distinction between taxes on
corporations and shareholders. And rhetorically, the categories used by the
ECJ (comparability, allocation versus exercise of taxing jurisdiction, and so
on) are so malleable that they provide very little predictive power as to how
future cases will be decided.
As we indicated at the beginning of this article, formulating a system
for the taxation of cross‐border dividends is a very difficult tax policy
enterprise, given the myriad of factors that must be addressed. At a
minimum, the ECJ’s response demonstrates the inadequacy of using a single
criterion, such as nondiscrimination, as the exclusive touchstone for such a
formulation.

Dividend Taxation in Europe (August 31, 2007 Draft)

Page 53

APPENDIX
ECJ Dividend Cases
Outbound Dividends

Inbound Dividends

Member State
Involved

Source country
(source of income; destination of
investment)

Residence country
(residence of shareholder; origin of
investment)

Potential Basis for
Discrimination

Origin of investment

Destination of investment

Potential Neutrality
Standard

Capital import neutrality

Capital export neutrality

Cases Involving
Individual
Shareholders

Fokus (2004) [EFTA Court]:
shareholder imputation credit
must be extended to foreign
shareholders

Verkooijen (2000);
exemption must be extended to
foreign dividends

Bouanich (2006):
capital gain taxation of
redemptions must be extended to
foreign shareholders

Lenz (2004):
lower rate must be extended to
foreign dividends
Manninen (2004); Meilicke (2007):
shareholder imputation credit must
be extended to foreign dividends
Kerckhaert (2006):
foreign withholding need not be
credited

Cases Involving
Corporate
Shareholders

Avoir Fiscal (1986):
shareholder credits must be
extended to foreign permanent
establishments
Metallgesellschaft (2001):
ACT exemption must be
extended to dividends paid to
foreign parents
ACT Test Claimants (2006):
shareholder imputation credit
need not be extended to foreign
parents
Denkavit (2006):
withholding exemption must be
extended to foreign parents

GraetzWarrenECJDividend.wpd/2007.08.31

St. Gobain (1999):
treaty exemption for dividends and
indirect foreign tax credit must be
extended to foreign permanent
establishments
FII Test Claimants (2006):
ACT exemption and shareholder
imputation tax credit must be
extended to foreign dividends

